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VITA AVETORIS 
Katherine Marie Brennan was born in February 18, 1913, in 
Philadelphia, Pa. Her primary and secondary education, howe-
ever, she received in the Middle West; and in September, 1930 
entered Mundelein College, Chicago, Illinois. In June, 1934 
she received the A.B. degree from Mundelein College. 
In September, 1934 she entered the Graduate School of 
Loyola University as a part-time graduate student in history. 
The time since then has been spent in graduate study at the 
University. 
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
Historians and diplomats have agreed that the question 
of the duchies of Schleswig and Holstein was a complicated 
one. Lord Palmerston said "that only three persons in Eu~ope 
were completely acquainted with the truth, the Prince Consort 
who was dead, a German professor who was in a lunatic asylumt 
--and himself and he had forgotten it." In spite of this we 
venture to consider the relation between the question of the 
duchies and the unification of Germany. 
In order to understand this relation, it is necessa~y to 
know the historical background of the question. In particular 
it is necessary to know the facts concerning the union existi 
between the two duchies and Denmark, and secondly, those con-
cerning the laws of succession in the duchies and in Denmark. 
Because of the conditions that resulted from the union between 
the duchies and Denmark and the conflict over the succession, 
it was possible for Prussia to interfere in the affairs of the 
duchies. 
In 1448, Christian I, Count of Oldenburg, became King of 
Denmark. Re also inherited the dukedoms of Schleswig and of 
Holstein. At this time Christian is supposed to have promised 
1 
the duchies that they would remain undivided. The union, how-
lGeorg Herbert :Munster-Led~nburgl toli tical Sketches o·t ~ State 2f Europe f!:2!!! 1814.;.67. Ea. n Urg'h: Edll1onstol1 am!' 
Douglas, 1868, 60 
2 
ever, between the duchies and the kingdom was a personal union 
only, arising from the fact that the duke of Schleswig-Rolsteil 
became the king of Denmark. Secondly, according to the old 
feudal system females could reign in Denmark, but in the duch-
ies the Salic law governed succession. Thus, on the extinctiol 
of the direct male line of the royal house, the kingdom and 
duchies would be separated: the kingdom would pass to the 
nearest royal prince while the duchies would pass to the near-
est n:ale heir. 
Both in the duchies and in the kingdom, nationalism and 
liberalism developed, especially during the first part of the 
nineteenth century. For a time the liberals, German and Danisi.t 
cooperated, but by 1848 their aims were so divergent that theil 
differences had developed into nationalistic antagonisms. The 
national party in the duchies, the Schleswig-Holsteiners, were 
imbued with the idea of a mtional German state which was to 
include not only Holstein and Lauenburg which were members of 
the German Confederation but would also include Schleswig. The 
claims of the Schleswig-Holsteiners were based on the followins 
issues: that Schleswig and Holstein were independent, sover-
eign states and united to Denmark in a personal union only; 
that Schleswig and Holstein were inseparably united to one an-
other, hence the name Schleswig-Holstein; and that the succes-
sion in the duchies was governed by the Salic law. 
The second party was the nationalist party in Denmark 
and in this party may be included the Danish nationalists in 
Schleswig. The Eider-Danes as these people were called based 
their position on the following points: that Schleswig was 
rightfully a province of the kingdom having been incorporated 
in 1721; that the so-called inseparable union between Schles-
wig and Holstein could not be justified by either law or by 
history; and that the succession in the duchies and in the 
kingdom was the same and governed by the ~ Regia of 1665 
which per.mitted the succession to pass through females. In 
criticigm of these opposing claims, it is true that as a mem-
ber of the Ger.man Confederation, Holstein was a sovereign 
state, but the status of Schleswig is more difficult to deter-
mine. However, it is true that the Eider-Danes were mistaken 
in maintaining that Schleswig had been incorporated with the 
kingdom. With regard to the real union of the duchies, "the 
Danes were justified in denying the applicability of the medi-
eval charters on which the claim was based--the fact that the 
duchies had been fiefs of different suzerains seems conclusive 
against it--but a ~.facto union had developed that had long 
been recognized in practice." Relative to the law of succes-
sion, it is true that the~ Regia had never been formally 
promulgated in Schleswig and that the old Salic law still 
2 
applied. 
In 1839 Frederick VI, King of Denmark, was succeeded by 
his nephew, Christian VIII. Christian had one son from whom h' 
expected no heir. Alarmed at the consequences that would fol-
low when the royal male line died out, ngmely, that the duchie 
and the kingdom would separate and each go its way under a dif 
ferent ruler, the Eider-Danes forced the government's hand. 
In 1846 Christian, in response to a question from the Estates 
of the Danish Islands, declared through a royal procl~ation, 
known as the Open Letter, that the succession in Schleswig 
was the same as that in the kingdom. Some doubts as to cer-
tain parts of Holstein were expressed, but with regard to the 
doubts the government declared that it was exerting itself to 
clear them. This proclamation called forth a burst of indig-
nation both in Germany and in the duchies, but before any 
change could be effected the Revolution of 1848 had begun. 
In January, 1848 Christian VIII had died. His son allied 
himself with the Danish democratic party. In March, he issued 
a liberal constitution for Denmark and one was planned for the 
whole monarchy. This constitution was to link Schleswig more 
closely to the kingdom than to Holstein. The duchies rose 
and established a Provisional Government. At first the duch-
ies were aided by the people of Prussia, but under pressure 
2Lawrence D. Steefel, The Schleswi~ Holstein Question. Cambridge: Harvard Universrty Press, 1 32,6-'7. 
5 
from Russia and Great Britain, the Prussians withdrew from the 
duchies and made separate peace with Denmark. The revolt 
ended with the Schleswig-Holsteiners in control of Schleswig. 
The suppression of the Revolution of 1848 in Germany was ef-
3 
fective in suppressing the revolt in the duchies. A confer-
ence was held at Olmutz in 1850 and as a result Austrian 
troops advanced into Holstein to disband the Schleswig-Hol-
stein army. Three commissioners Austrian, Prussian, and Dan-
ish administered Holstein; Schleswig was returned to Denmark, 
and in 1852 Danish rule was in full operation. 
Because it was foreseen that the union between Denmark 
and the duchies which had been established by a dynastic ac-
cident might be destroyed by another such accident, it was de-
cided to take some measures to stabilize the succession. The 
main line of the ruling dynasty was dying out, and the succes-
sion was certain to pass through the female line to the Glucks-
burg branch of the family. Schleswig-Holstein, since its suc-
cession was governed by the Salic law, would pass, not to the 
Glucksburg her, but to the younger Augustenburg branch. At a 
conference of the great powers held in London in 1852 this sue-
cession was changed and the succession to the Danish throne was 
regulated. The resulting treaty is known as the London Proto-
col. As a result of this conference the Duke of Augustenburg 
3yunroe Smith, Bismarck and German Unitz. New York: 
The Columbia Press, l9i5, 25.---
6 
gave up his possessions, and as compensation he received two 
million dollars. He renounced for himself and for his descen-
4 
dants all claims on the duchies. Prince Christian of the Hol- · 
stein GlUcksburg branch was recognized as heir to the whole 
Danish monarchy, and was adopted by the King of Denmark. It 
further decreed that Schleswig should be permanently associ-
ated with Denmark. This protocol was signed by Austria and 
Prussia as European powers, not as members of the Confederatio • 
The German Confederation did not ratify it nor did Schleswig-
Holstein. Austria and Prussia in signing the treaty did so 
only in light of a previous treaty with Denmark by which she 
bound herself to respect the autonomy of Schleswig and Holstei 
not to incorporate Schleswig nor to put any obstacle in the 
5 
way of the use of the Ger.man language. Denmark, unfortunately, 
did not observe these agreements. 
From 1852 to 1863 Denmark by her actions succeeded in 
making herself very unpopular in the duchies. The Democratic 
party in Copenhagen was in power. The leaders were imbued 
with the ever constant idea of incorporating Schleswig and to 
make the Eider the southern boundary of Denmark. The engage-
. 4cambridge History 2f British Foreign Policl• Edited by 
S1r A.W1 Ward and G.P. Gooch. New York: The Macmillan Co~­pa~, 1~23, II~ 539 1 This reference states that the Duke did not sign away nis r1ghts. 
5Smith, 26-27. 
7 
menta toward the duchies that Denmark had assumed in the t~ea-
ty with Austria and Prussia in 1852 had not been kept. Pub· 
lic opinion in Germany was in favor of the oppressed duchies 
and the unpopular middle states sought to regain their popu-
6 
larity by favoring the rights of the duchies. 
The Diet of the German Confederation had discussed and 
amused itself with the question of the duchies between 1852 
and 1863. However, on March 30, 1863 the Danish government 
took the first step in a series of events that was to lead to 
the eventual solution of the Dano-German question. On this 
date by a royal ordinance, the March Patent, Holstein was ex-
cluded from the common oonstitution of the Danish monarchy. 
It would seem also that the intention was to incorporate Schle -
7 
wig into the monarchy. The Patent was placed before the Fed-
eral Diet. The Diet called upon Denmark to revoke the Patent 
and to stand by the agreements of 1851 and 1852. This demand 
was made on ~uly 9, 1863 and the reply was to be forthcoming 
within six weeks. On August 27, Denmark replied to the ef-
feet that she would not revoke the Patent. At the same time 
the Danish reply together with the demands of the Confeder-
ation were laid before the usual committee of the Diet. On 
October 1, 1863, it was voted that since Denmark had not ful-
6MUnster, 8. 
7steefel, 56. 
8 
filled its obligations, the demands of the Diet were to be en~ 
forced by a federal execution of Holstein. 
In the meantime in Denmark, Hall, President of the Danish 
council, had been pushing plans for a new Constitution the 
basis of which was the March Patent. The draft af the new 
Constitution passed its third reading on November 13, 1863. 
It legally established the common oonstitution for both 
wig and the kingdom; it regulated the relations of this new 
constitutional unit to the German Federal lands of the monarc 
it provided for the composition and powers of the Rigsraad 
Denmark and Schleswig. These were the new features of the 
stitution but many of its provisions were the same as those of 
the Constitution of 1855. "Even assuming that the November 
Constitution involved neither the 'incorporation' of Schleswig 
nor a step leading thereto, the fact remains that it marks the 
definite abandonment of the 'whole state• policy provided for 
8 
by the agreements of 1851-52." 
On the following d~, November 15, Frederick VII, King of 
Denmark, died quite suddenly before he gave the new constitu-
tion his formal approval. He was the last male in the direct 
line of the Danish royal house. In accordance with the Lon-
don treaty and the Danish law of succession of 1853 he was 
succeeded by Prince Christian of Schleswig-Holstein-Sondenburg 
8~ •• 74. 
Glucksburg as King Christian IX. The first question that con-
fronted the new king was whether or not he should sign the new 
constitution. This question was further complicated because 
he wanted to retain the friendship of all the people, yet his 
right to succeed to the duchies was questionable. Further, he 
did not want to alienate the people of the duchies nor did he 
wish to alienate the Danes. The ministry urged the king to 
sign the Constitution and he finally yielded signing it on 
November 18, 1863. It was to go into effect at the new year. 
The death of Frederick complicated the question of the 
special rights of Schleswig with the broader question of suo-
cession in both duchies. According to the London Protocol, 
Christian IX became duke of Schleswig-Holstein as well as King 
of Demark. The German Confederation, however, it will be 
remembered, had never signed the treaty nor agreed to its sti-
pulations, nor had the people of Schleswig-Holstein. Prussia 
and Austria had signed only in view of a previous agreement 
with Denmark. When the news that Christian had signed the new 
Constitution arrived Germany there was an outburst of national 
feeling which found a rallying point around Prince Frederick of 
Augustenburg, the eldest son of Duke Christian who had renounce 
9 
his rights to the duchies in 1852. Notwithstanding the fact 
that his father had renounced his rights to the throne, Fred-
9cambridge History ~British Foreign Policx. Edited by 
Sir A.W. Ward and G.P. Gooch. New York: The Macmillan Com-
pany, 1923, II, 539. This reference states that the Duke did 
not sign away his rights. 
10 
erick went to Gotha on November 17. He set up a Court there 
and was allowed to organize a provisional government, with two 
commissioners, one a Saxon and the other a Hanoverian. These 
two were to conduct the provisional government in the name ot 
10 
the Diet. He acknowledged the Constitution of 1848 and set up 
a liberal ministry. The peop~ of Holstein received him with 
acclamation as Duke Frederick VIII. The nobility of the duchy 
opposed him and were in favor of a union with Denmark, but 
later they changed and were in favor of a union with Prussia. 
Not only were Denmark and the duchies disturbed by the 
claims of Frederick of Augustenburg but the other nations were 
interested because of the London treaty of 1852 which many of 
them had signed. Austria and Prussia were particularly in-
terested. To Bismarck went the opportunity of deciding the 
course that Prussia was to follow. Two courses were open. 
Prussia could recognize the London Protocol as still binding 
and force Christian IX, as duke of Schleswig-Holstein, to ob-
serve the preliminary treaty that she and Austria had signed 
with Denmark which guaranteed the autonomy of Schleswig. On 
the other hand, Prussia could declare the London Protocol 
abrogated, recognize Frederick as the rightful duke and help 
him gain possession of Schleswig. To the Germans this latter 
course would have been favorable, but this would have been 
1o Munster,. 85. 
1 
harmful to the real interest, not only of the Germanies but of 
Prussia. The revolutionary nature of the popular program and 
the necessary scrapping of treaties that it would have entaile 
would have roused all Europe against Prussia. And even if suc-
cessful, there would only have been added to the German states 
another petty state. This would be another obstacle in the 
way of Prussian hegemony. However, if the first course was 
adopted, namely, to accept the situation as it existed accor-
ding to the London Protocol, Prussia would demand that Schles-
wig should not be incorporated by Denmark. If Bismarck won 
this point, Prussia would have to restore both duchies to Den-
mark, but this was what Austria desired and German patriots 
11 
feared. Bismarck, however, had satisfied himself that the 
Danish government would not consent to non-incorporation of 
Schleswig and would go to war rather than adhere to Prussian 
demands. Prussia did not act alone in this. Bismarck per• 
suaded Austria that if she did not support him in these mea-
sures he and his ministry would retire. The consequences of 
this would be a wave of radicalism and liberalism that Austria 
alone could not avoid. On January 16, 1864 Austria and Prus-
sia signed a joint agreement the provisions of which were as 
follows: 
11amith, JB-31. 
(1) a demand upon Denmark for the withdrawal 
of the November Constitution within 48 hours; 
(2) independent joint action by Prussia and 
Austria if the Confederate Diet refused to join proposed measures; (3) the preparation 
of the necessary military forces; (4) the 
suppression of possible hostile demonstra-
tions in case of the occupation of Schles-
wig; (5) the acceptance of a conference of 
powers only after the withdrawal of the 
November constitution; and (6) further con-
sultat~on in case of interference by either 
power. 
The Diet did not approve of these measures, but Austria and 
Prussia acted as two great powers. The ultimatum was sent to 
Denmark on the same day that the agreement between the two 
powers was signed. The ministers of Austria and Prussia pre-
sented the ultimatum, but the reply was a refusal. Even if 
the king had been inclined to withdraw the new Constitution, 
he had to have the consent of the parliament. The time given 
for the answer, two days, was insufficient for such procedure. 
Then, the king felt that he had the support of the people and 
a reasonable expectation of foreign intervention so he did not 
hesitate to refuse. Diplomatic relations were broken off 
after the refusal was given. 
In spite of the presence of the Federal Army, which had 
been in Holstein since the federal execution on December 7, 
1863, the Austro-Prussian army which had been in readiness 
l2Lucius H. Holt and A.w. Chilton, History 2! Euro~e ~ 
1862 12, !2.!!• from ~ Accessi£!! 2! Bismarck 12. ~ outbreak 
of the Great War. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1918, 77. 
-- -
1~ 
marched into Holstein and advanced towards the Eider and the 
frontier of Schleswig. On January 31, 1864 before marching 
into Schleswig, the two powers announced that the integrity of 
Denmark would be respected and that the two powers were wil-
ling to attend a European conference. But if Denmark opened 
hostilities all treaty obligations were annulled and foreign 
intervention would only make the fate of Denmark more precar-
ious. On February 1, 1864 the allied troops, 60,000 Austrians 
and Prussians began to cross the Eider into Schleswig. The 
Danes could not withstand the onslaughts of the allies and on 
April 18, the fortifications at DUppel were stormed by the 
Prussians. A week later, April 25, representatives of the 
European powers met in London for a conference. Bismarck 
had acceded to the requests of Great Britain for a conference. 
On May 12, a truce of one month was arranged, but later it 
was extended until JUne 25. The negotiations were fruitless. 
Denmark refused to return to a personal union and demanded 
the annexation of part of Schleswig. By this action Denmark 
alienated the other powers many of whom had been friendly 
toward her. 
War was resumed on June 25 when General Herwath von :Bit-
tenfeld stormed the island of AE en. The Danes had considered 
this island impregnable without a fleet. The Prussian army 
would have gone to Ffihnen also, but Austria who had entered 
Jutland against her will refused to cooperate with Prussia in 
these measures. While the Austrians and Prussians were vio· 
torious, the Saxons and Hanoverians had to stand idly by and 
13 
in many places collisions occurred. A preliminary peace was 
signed in which Denmark yielded up her rights in the three 
duchies--Schleswig, Holstein, and Lauenburg. After further 
negotiations to determine the boundary lines and to determine 
the duchies' share of the Danish debt, the final treaty of 
peace was signed at Vienna on October 27, 1864. 
14 
Thus ended the first step in Bismarck's design to elim-
inate Austria from the German confederation. He had separated 
the duchies from Denmark; he had succeeded in having them 
placed under the joint possession of Austria and Prussia. Fur-
thermore, Prussia had always appeared diplomatically in the 
right and her opponent in the wrong. In this w~ the inter-
vention of France and England on behalf of Denmark had been 
forestalled, and a possible attack from Austria had been fore-
stalled because her support had been enlisted. 
13MUnster, 87. 
CHAPTER I COlfVENTION OF GASTEIN 
At the conclusion of the treaty of peace with Denmark• 
Austria and Prussia exercised joint sovereignty over the two 
duchies. This was what Bismarck desired because it would fur-
nish a convenient pretext for war with Austria. Bismarck 
considered such a war necessary to the successful solution of 
the question of German unity. The duchies themselves were a 
stake in the game because while they would be of little ad-
vantage to Austria, their annexation to Prussia would be gain-
ful and feasible. If the duchies were of no possible gain to 
AUstria, why had Austria joined Prussia? Austria could not 
have acted differently. If Bismarck had rejected the London 
Protocol, then Austria could have appeared as the defender of 
the treaty. Unfortunately for Austria, Bismarck abided by 
the ~reaty. If she had not joined Prussia, then Prussia 
would have defended them alone, and consequently would have 
annexed the duchies and gained the prestige and power for 
herself alone. That Austria was duped cannot be maintained 
1 
because she realized the purpose in Bismarck's mind. 
The Condominium exercised by the two powers led quite 
early to trouble. Austria was willing to turn over the duch-
ies to Prussia in return for compensation in Silesia, but 
William was not willing to give up any portion of his domin-
ions. After this refusal, Austria pushed forward the claims 
1 smitE, 32-34. 
15 
6 
of Frederick of Augustenburg. Under him the duchies were to 
become members of the German Confederations. Many of the Ger-
mans as well as some Prussians favored this solution, but not 
Bismarck. His policy was one whereby the duchies would even-
tually be incorporated in Prussia. In order to accomplish 
this, it was necessary to keep off the throne of the duchies, 
Duke Frederick of Augustenburg. However, Bismarck could not 
refuse Austria outright when she pressed these claims. In-
stead he delayed the matter by questionning not only the 
validity of the Augustenburg claims which were surrounded 
with a certain amount of doubt, but also the claims of others; 
2 
among the claimants was the Grand Duke of Oldenburg. 
In the duchies themselves there was considerable agita-
tion in favor of the Hereditary Prince. After the military 
occupation by Austria and Prussia had been established and 
the provisional government set up according to the provisions 
of the treaty of Vienna, a pretense was made of permitting 
the people of the duchies to express their wishes with respect 
to the future government of the duchies. In Holstein public 
meetings were held at which the almost unanimous vote was 
that the people desired to be united to the German Confedera-
3 
tion as a sovereign state und~r the Prince of Augustenburg. 
2Lucius H. Holt and A.W. Chilton, Historz of EuroRe 
1862-1914. New York: Macmillan Company, 88. --
3sir Alexander Malet, The Overthrow of the Germanic 
federation £l Prussia in 1866: London: LOngmans, Green 
Company, 1870, 96. - -- ----
from 
-
17 
The civil commissioners who were administering the affairs 
the affairs of the duchies for the condominate powers inquired 
on December ?, 1864, of the clergy and civic officers of the 
duchies as to their wishes with regard to the future govern-
ment of the duchies. To this inquiry they replied that their 
4 
wishes were identical to those already expressed by the people. 
Toward the end of December, a small portion of the landed 
population led by Baron Scheel Plessen expressed its wishes 
for annexation to Prussia. But this elicited expressions of 
counter-opinion from the greater majority of the population. 
On January 12, 1865 a committee of the Schleswig-Holstein 
union publicized a proclamation containing 60,000 signatures 
protesting any attempt to infringe on the relation existing 
between the Hereditary Prince and the duchies. This publica-
tion also protested any possible attempt to segregate part of 
the territory under another ruler. Further demonstrations of 
this kind followed in February. However, other events with 
regard to the relations between Austria and Prussia took place 
during February. On February 21, 1865 the Austrian govern-
ment was the recipient of a Prussian despatch to the effect 
that the latter government required the assistance and coop-
eration of the Imperial government in a system of government 
for the duchies which she (Prussia) had evolved. The contents 
of this despatch laid down the conditions which Prussia con-
sidered essential to maintain in order to safeguard the in-
4Ibid. 
18 
5 
terests of both Prussia and Germany in the duchies. To this 
despatch Count Mensdorff, the Austrian Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, replied on March 5. Mensdorff, in a definite tone, 1 
said that the conditions laid down by the Prussian govern-
ment were not consonant with Federal rights. At the same 
time he demanded the re-establishment of the independence of 
both duchies and that their future relations with Prussia 
be conducted according to the articles of the Federal Diet. 
These measures had been demanded by Prussia in order to 
subdue the various agitations in the duchies. To this Prus-
sian despatch, or to the February demands as they are better 
known, representatives of the two duchies replied in a de-
claration dated March 26. This declaration rejected for the 
most part the February demands of Prussia; secondly, it in-
dicated certain mncessions which their future Duke might 
make without infringing on the rights of the duchies. on 
April 19, 117 delegates of the Schleswig-Holstein associa-
tions approved this declaration, as had the Prince himself 
on March 31. 
While the duchies and the governments of Austria and 
Prussia were busy trying to effect a solution, the other 
members of the Confederation were anxious to bring about a 
solution that would be satisfactory to the whole Confedera-
tion. Consequently on March 27, Bavaria, Saxony, and the 
5 Ibid., 98-99. 
Grand Duchy of Hesse placed a proposition relative to the solu-
tion of the question before the assembly of the Diet. The 
motion was as follows: 
Awaiting ulterior decision, the Diet con-
fidently expects that the Governments of 
Austria and Prussia will now hand over the 
Duchy of Holstein to the Government of the 
Hereditary Prince of Schleswig-Holstein-
Augustenburg; and communicate with the 
Diet in reference to the agreement they 
have come to concerning the Duchy of Lauen-
burg. 
There are some who maintain that this proposition was insti-
6 
gated by Austria, but the truth of this cannot be determined. 
The Prussian government, however, was inclined to believe this. 
The arguments of Saxony and Bavaria as expressed by their 
respective leaders, Beust and Pfordten, contained a great deal 
of truth, but Bismarck was not to be defeated. While the 
leaders in the lesser states might see what the outcome would 
be they could do nothing. Bismarck was supported not only by 
Moltke and the army, but by ne n such as Heinrich von Treitschke 
who said: "In this matter Schleswig-Holstein positive law 
is irreconcileable with the vital interests of our country. 
We must set aside positive law and compensate those who may be 
? 
injured in consequence •••• • Bismarck, of course, denied 
6Heinrich Von Sybel, The Foundi~ of the German Empire Bl 
Willism I. (Transl. by Marshall Liv~~Bto~errin). lew 
York: T.nomas Y. Crowell and Company, Ll891, c.dJ IV, 109-113. 
7R.B. Mowat, ! History 2f European Diplomacy, 1815-1914. 
London: Edward Arnold and Company, 192?, 186. 
the right of the Diet to handle this situation. 
Nevertheless, on April 6, the vote on the proposition 
submitted by the three states was taken and was adverse to 
Prussia by a vote of nine to six. To this decision Prussia 
replied she expected that before any formal declaration of 
views was made by the Diet that an inquiry into the various 
claims, not only those of Augustenburg, should be made, and 
that those of the House of Brandenburg should be considered. 
Austria adhered to the proposition of the three states only 
to the extent to which it did not disturb the relations 
existing between Austria and Prussia. 
The population of the duchies was becoming more outspo-
ken and more audacious in the plans for the coronation of 
Prince Frederick of Augustenburg. On April 3, Baron von 
Zedlitz, the Prussian commissioner in the duchies, issued a 
statement to the effect that the Prussian marine station was 
8 
to be transferred from Danzig to Kiel. At first, Halbhuber, 
20 
the Austrian commissioner, agreed to take part in the pre-
liminary arrangements, but on April 11, he received word from 
Vienna to stop the preparations; which he did by forbidding 
the governments of the duchies to take part in the prepara-
tions. Later he published his prohibition in the newspapers. 
Mensdorff made the official protest to Berlin for Austria as 
8s.ybel, IV, 112. Royal command to this effect had been 
issued on March 24 by William to the Minister of the Navy to 
signify that Prussia would not be pushed out of the duchies 
by either the Diet or Augustenburg. 
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a member of the Confederation and as a joint owner in Schles-
wig. The matter was finally decided by Austria's pacific 
policy. Austria agreed to this transfer of the naval station 
on condition that the military forces of Prussia should be 
reduced by a number equal to that of the force to be stationed 
9 
at Kiel. 
On April 20 and 21, occurred an event of not much impor-
tance in itself but one with a certain ~ount of significance. 
on these dates cornerstones of two monuments to commemorate 
those who died in the war of 1864 were laid in Alsen and Dup-
pel. Both Austrian and Prussian troops took part in this com-
memoration. But the Prussian royal rescript which was pub-
lished on the occasion stated that these monuments would serve 
to keep up the courage of those who had fought in the war of 
1864, "!! called~~ defend the fruit of their victory with 
the sword." This seems to indicate that there was present the 
idea of a future conflict with regard to the disposal of the 
duchies. 
Meanwhile, Bigmarck was pressing plans for the convening 
of the Assembly of the Estates of Schleswig and Holstein 
under the joint authority of Austria and Prussia. From this 
assembly he hoped to obtain, at least, accession to the de-
mands put forth in the February despatch, if not consent to 
9Malet, 104. 
annexation of the duchies by Prussia. Von Richthofen, Am-
bassador in Hamburg, Baron Scheel Plessen in Holstein, and 
Baron von Zedlitz advised against this. They maintained 
22 
that this would only be playing into the hands of the politi· 
cal societies who controlled the duchies and who would only 
vote against the demands of Prussia. These societies fa-
vored Augustenburg. Bismarck communicated his plans for con-
voking the Estates to the Austrian government on April 17. 
Mensdorff replied on April 27 to the effect that this 
proposition was both surprising and disagreeable. He fur-
ther insisted on the rights of Augustenburg as sovereign. 
However, Austria would agree to summon the Estates before 
the actual coronation of the sovereign (this Austria con-
sidered opposed to all principles of government) on three 
conditions: 
'First, in all negotiations with the Es-
tates, the supreme civil authorities must 
act strictly on the basis of the joint 
ownership; neither of the two Governments 
shall by itself have any separate dealings 
with the Estates. Secondly, in the sum-
mons the object in view shall be distinct-
ly stated and limited; the Estates must 
be given to understand that they have to 
express the wishes of the country, but 
that this expression shall in no way an-
ticipate or interfere with the decision 
of the future sovereign, nor, so far as 
Holstein is concerned, with the decrees 
of the German Confederation. Thirdly, 
Austria is willing to have the Estates 
summoned according to the electoral law 
of 1848; but yet, since the Constitutions 
of 1854 have never been revoked, it 
seems advisable, in order to insure 
the legality of the assembly to al-
low the convention of the same to be 
autho~~zed by the Estates as they now 
exist. 
23 
Prussia could not accept these conditions because they were 
contrary to her plans, and secondly, because these conditions 
implied Austria's assent to the Prussian February demands, 
but these had already (March 5, 1865) been refused by Austria. 
Bismarck replied to this latest Austrian note on May 7, 
and at the same time suggested that an assembly should be 
called, the representatives to be chosen by universal suf-
frage and direct election. He also suggested that it would 
not be proper for the Hereditary Prince to remain in the 
duchies while the elections were held. Austria accepted this 
11 
second Prussian proposal, but with conditions. 
Great interest was evinced in the negotiations between 
the two powers. France, Hanover, and Bavaria in particular 
showed their interest. In France the newspapers were very 
friendly to Bismarck. However, in the duchies the effect of 
the Prussian proposals was unfavorable. The people regarded 
these measures as a subterfuge for a Prussian retreat. Con-
sequently, the agitation for Augustenburg was increased by the 
members of the political societies. Bismarck, however, had 
lOsybel, IV, 125, cites the Austrian reply of April 27. 
llibid., 128. 
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been warned that this would happen, but he had proceeded a-
gainst the advice of Scheel Plessen and Zedlitz. The agita-
tors began to formulate platforms in which they stated that no 
man would be chosen as a representative unless he promised 
"to vote in the very first session for the proclamation of 
nuke Frederick VIII as sovereign, and for the resolution that 
the Assembly is incompetent to act until the Duke is crowned." 
Bismarck still remained self-assured of the success of his 
plans. 
Prussia still had complaints to offer against the at-
titude of Austria. These were compiled and forwarded to 
Werther, the Prussian Minister at Vienna. Werther was in-
structed to discuss each one separately with Mensdorff. At 
the same time, however, he was instructed to assure Mensdorff 
of Prussia's desire for peace, but to indicate that the Prus-
sian government was willing to resort to armed force, if the 
occasion demanded such a display. To these complaints Mens-
dorff agreed to prevent the proclamation of Augustenburg as 
Duke. He further agreed to urge Halbhuber to adopt a more 
friendly attitude toward Prussia. Unfortunately, the main 
tenor of the Austrian reply was haughty and domineering• and 
the Austrians persisted in their first views. This attitude, 
however, caused no alarm in Prussia because the Prussian 
government was well aware of the internal dissension of the 
Austrian empire. On May 19, instructions were drawn up for 
r 25 
General Manteuffel in case it was necessary to send him to 
Vienna if relations became any worse. The purpose of his mis-
sion was to be to bring about a better understanding. 
Before this precipitous mission was to take place, a 
Ministerial Council was held in Berlin on May 29.~ The King 
presided, and both the Crown Prince and Moltke attended. 
The King stated that although the war of 1864 had been con-
ducted not for Prussian interests, but for national ones, 
that Austria was fully cognizant of the fact that Prussia 
expected to be repaid for her sacrifices. Bismarck then rose 
and continued with his remarks. First, Prussia could limit 
herself to the February demands; secondly, Prussia could 
secure the duchies through the payment of an indemnity to 
Austria, and a payment could also be made to the claimants 
to the throne of the duchies; and, thirdly, Prussia could se-
cure the duchies by a formal demand for annexation. The at-
titude of the Austrian Emperor with regard to the second al-
ternative was already known, and consequently was not to be 
considered. The third alternative would undoubtedly bring 
about war with Austria. The majority of the Council was a-
gainst measures that would lead to war; the King reserved 
his decision; and Manteuffel was not sent to Vienna. 
Between May 24 and June 24, several notes were exchanged 
between Bismarck and Mensdorff. The purpose of these was to 
determine how the elections should be conducted, whether or 
26 
not the Hereditary Prince should remain in the duchies, and 
to decide what procedure should be adopted with regard to 
other claimants, namely, the Grand Duke of Oldenburg, who was 
a Confederate Prince. On June 24, Mensdorff, however, de-
-
cided to adopt a more conciliatory policy toward Prussia. He 
was forced to do this because he did not wish to come to is-
sue with Prussia in view of the precarious situation of the 
internal affairs of the Empire. Austria agreed to the es-
tablishment of the naval port and Confederate fortress at 
Kiel. With regard to military control, the Austrian govern-
ment said that it could not decide, but that this decision 
lay with the Confederate Diet. The other arrangements would 
have to be made between Prussia and the future sovereign. Co~ 
sequently, the first step was to decide who the future sov-
ereign would be. The Prussian cabinet recognized Austria's 
change of manner by declaring its readiness to submit the 
question of the military organization of the Holstein con-
tingent to the Confederation. Prussia also stated that she 
was disposed to establish the Grand Duke of Oldenburg as 
Duke, if Austria would join her in this action. On this 
point, however, they were as far apart as ever for Austria 
still favored Augustenburg while Prussia would accept him 
on no conditions whatever. 
In the duchies, meanwhile, the agitation in favor of 
Augustenburg continued, and annexation to Prussia was 
27 
ridiculed and despised on every side. The Austrian government 
however, realized that the cause of Augustenburg might be fos-
tered more advantageously if he removed himself from the duch-\ 
ies. Consequently, a note suggesting this was sent to him at 
Kiel, accompanied by an Austrian declaration of protection for 
him. At this same time the same thought occurred to Willi~ 
who sent him a letter advising his absence from the duchies. 
But Frederick refused to withdraw. His cause was looked upon 
with greater favor than ever by the population of the duchies. 
Arrangements were made for the celebration of the birthday of 
the Prince on July 6. Simultaneously, the crown lawyers pre-
sented their findings with regard to the right of Augustan-
burg to the throne of the duchies, which right they declared 
did not exist. The basis for this judgment was the Law of 
Succession which had been established by the London Protocol 
of 1852. There were many legal intricacies and artifXes in 
this report which made it interesting and which succeeded in 
giving it importance from both an international and a nation-
12 
al viewpoint. This report finally released William from any 
obligations that he had felt concerning Augustenburg as a 
rightful German prince. From that time on the February de-
mands became the Prussian program of procedure in the duchies. 
12rbid., 158-165. Consult these pages for a description 
of the Council of Crown lawyers and for a criticism of this 
report. 
J"'' -------------------------------. 
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Consequently Zedlitz in the duchies was instructed to 
suppress any dangerous agitation and also to suppress in as 
many instances as possible any celebration of the birthday of 
A~gustenburg. At the same time the King addressed a note to 
the Emperor of Austria asking for his cooperation in removing 
the Prince from the duchies. While waiting for a reply from 
the Emperor, the Prince's birthday was celebrated in the 
duchies. In the towns, there were large demonstrations, 
especially in Kiel, but in the rural districts there were no 
such demonstrations. These districts had acceded to Zed-
litz's proclamation of July 5. Because of the possibility 
of war with Austria, if the Emperor's answer was not satis-
factory, the Prussian government began to make military pre-
parations. The word that the government received from the 
military officials was very satisfactory as to the condition 
of the Prussian military forces. 
On July 11 or 12, there arrived from Vienna a despatch 
from the Emperor and one from Mensdorff. Both urged the 
Prussian King to desist in his hostile attitude toward the 
prince and to recognize him as the sovereign of the duchies. 
In Mensdorff's letter he asked whether or not a special a-
gent could be sent by Prussia to either Carlsbad or to Gas-
tein to discuss the Schleswig-Holstein question. Bismarck 
answered that this would be acceptable and that Austria's 
concessions had been quite satisfactory except for her re-
29 
fusal to change her policy with regard to Augustenburg. The 
prince, he considered as an undermining influence in the duch-
ies. 
A Council of the Ministry was called to meet at Ratisbon 
on ~uly 21 to consider what final measures were to be adopted 
by Prussia with regard to the duchies and the Austrian atti-
13 
tude. Besides the ultimatum which was to be prepared to be 
sent to Austria, preparations for military measures in Holstein 
were made. Instructions were prepared to be sent to General 
Herwarth in case such military measures were necessary. Prus~ 
sia also took steps to assure herself of the friendly attitude 
of France and of Italy. The ultimatum that was sent to Aus-
tria read as follows: 
'All negotiations concerning the future of 
the Duchies are refused until authority is 
established there and all agitation done a-
way with. When this is accomplished, Prus-
sia will be ready to treat with Austria con-
certning the establishment of the Grand Duke 
of Oldenburg as sovereign. The candidacy of 
Augustenburg is entirely out of the question 
for us, so long as the Hereditary Prince per-
sists in his attitude of usurpation. Should 
Austria refuse to restore order in the Duch-
ies, Prussia will find herself in a situation 
necessitating self-defense, and will, on her 
own account, instruct General Herwarth to 
take the necessary steps. The further de-
cision, whether or not Herwarth shall receive 
13Letter of Bismarck to Crown Prince, ~uly 15, 1865 with 
regard to the Conference. 
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orders to this effect, depends upon the 
proposed visit of the Emperor Francis Jo-
seph to Gastein, and the result of the 
meeting of the two Sovereigns.•l4 
After the ultimatum was sent, the King, Bismarck, and General 
Manteuffel set out for Gastein, but stopped en route at Salz-
burg for a conference with von Pfordten, the President of the 
Bavarian Ministry. Pfordten had reviewed the Prussian cause 
with greater favor than his colleague Beust of Saxony. Beust 
refused to adopt any other than a hostile attitude toward Prus 
sia. At Salzburg, on July 25, Pfordten after conversations 
with Bismarck and the King becmne convinced of Prussia's 
15 
desire for peace. After-his return to Munich he communicated 
these impressions to Count Mensdorff and to Augustenburg• 
urging the latter to abide by the wishes of William. 
Meanwhile in Austria there was a change in the Ministry. 
Dissatisfaction with the Schmerling ministry had been ex-
pressed throughout the Empire. On July 27, a new ministry 
was formed with Belcredi as ~nister of State and President of 
the Ministerial Council. Despite these precarious conditions 
--the army had been reduced, Hungary was expressing dissatis-
faction--Mensdorff had to reply to the Prussian ultimatum. In 
14sybel, IV, 175,cites this ultimatum. 
15Munster, 91. Bismarck is reported to have said to 
Pfordten that "if the rest of Germany would only be sensible 
enough to play the part of a passive spectator, the duel be-
tween Austria and Prussia might be fought out." 
r 
view of the internal affairs of the .Empire a peaceful policy 
was the wisest one to adopt. count Esterhazy, the minister 
without a portfolio, favored a conciliatory policy toward 
16 
prussia. At this time Count Blome, the Austrian ambassador 
17 
at Munich came to Esterhazy with his plan for conciliation. 
count Blome was a native nobleman of Holstein and as such he 
opposed Augustenburg, but as an Austrian diplomat he was 
forced to uphold Austria's support of Augustenburg. 
31 
His plan was very simple: Austria would annex Holstein, 
and Prussia, Schleswig. Esterhazy approved this plan as did 
18 
the Emperor. Blome was given instructions to go to Gastein. 
First he was to attempt to gain Prussian recognition for 
Augustenburg. Secondly, if Prussia persisted in her opposi-
tion, he was to inquire as to the possibility of the adoption 
of his plan of division. At the same time Herwarth was 
carrying out some of his instructions; and the notes ex-
changed between Bismarck and Mensdorff were inimical to the 
success of Blome's e~forts. Blome according to instructions 
began his overtures by requesting that Prussia recognize 
16Chester Wells Clark, Franz Joseph ~ Bismarck. Cam-
bridge: Harvard University Press, 1934, 241. See also, Sybel, 
IV, 180-189 for description of internal affairs. 
17
clark, 254-256, for origin of Blome's plan. 
18ill£. 
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Frederick. Bismarck answered by refusing to consider Augus-
tenburg and continued to press the claims of the Grand Duke 
of Oldenburg. He said that Prussia could proceed to no set-
tlement until she was guaranteed that her February demands 
would be accepted. According to him, the Grand Duke of Olden-
burg was likely to accede to these demands. Blome also had 
an interview with the King who said that Austria had been 
placing obstacles in the way of Prussia ever since the Seven 
Years• War. William also complained of Halbhuber•s conduct 
in the duchies. Blome had answered these charges without in-
forming either the King or Bismarck of his alternate plan. 
Finally he spoke in bare outline of this plan to Bismarck to 
which the latter replied that the plan might be worthwhile, 
but that certain reservations would probably have to be made. 
Nothing definite was to be decided until the two sovereigns 
19 
would meet. Blome returned to Ischl on July 31, where the 
Emperor was staying. 
A Ministerial Council was held at which Franz Joseph 
20 
himself presided. There was a party in the Council which de-
l9Letter of Bismarck to William{ August 1, 1865 requested 
that this plan be kept secret. Part tion was ~he last resort. 
20 clark, 275. This Council was secret; no secretaries 
admitted, bu~ Ministers alternated at taking the minutes. No 
copies of these minutes have been retained in the archives. 
"One thing was certain; the 'inevitable' war with Prussia had 
now become a very real fact to all, and even to the Emperor 
himself." Clark, 282. 
Biegleben, the expert on German affairs, was thunder-
struck at the idea of partition. He had been kept in ignor-
ance of the plan in order to forestall his opposition to it. 
33 
sired to go to war rather than desert Augustenburg. Howe~er, 
the Emperor who was still anxious to preserve peace decided to 
endorse Blome's proposals. The plan was dran up in detail 
according to orders and approved by both Mensdorff and the Em-
peror. On August 7, the Emperor sent King William an auto-
graph letter which was taken to Gastein by Blome and presented 
to William on August 8. The Emperor remarked in it that the 
course they were about to adopt was not "consistent with the 
original aim of the Danish war." During the time in which 
Blome had been at Ischl, Prussia had pushed forward her war 
preparations, and had been sounding France and Italy with 
regard to their attitudes in case of war. By the time Blome 
returned, however, no definite agreements had been made. 
The second and final set of negotiations began at Gastein 
on August 10, 1865. Prussia still insisted that she would not 
consider a proposition alluding to the final disposition of 
the duchies until order was restored therein. Consequently, 
the discussion centered round Blome's proposal for rearranging 
21 
the government of the duchies. Blome presented his plan some 
of which points displeased Bismarck who himself had worked out 
a more definite proposition. However, Bismarck in view of the 
European situation which was not definitely favorable to him, 
decided to make no mention of his plan, but to accept Blome's 
proposals. Austria, in proposing this plan which became the 
2lsee Appendix A. 
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basis for the final treaty, implied that she and Prussia were 
the legitimate sovereigns in the duchies since no one but a 
sovereign could have the proper authority to dispose of pos-
sessions. Consequently, this should have meant that the Augus 
tenburg agitation would be subdued because his claims were 
fallacious if Austria and Prussia were the legitimate sover-
22 
eigne. 
On August 14, Bismarck and Blome signed the completed 
23 
treaty, and on August 20, the treaty was ratified by William 
and Franz Joseph at a meeting in Salzburg. The treaty was to 
go into effect on September 1'5. It provided that the govern-
ment of Holstein was to be administered by Austria and that 
of Schleswig by Prussia. The l1lnperor of Austria ceded his 
rights in Lauenburg for an indemnity of 2,500,000 Danish rix-
dollars. There were other provisions with regard to forti-
24 
fications. Prussia named General Baron von Manteuffel as 
22For the intricacies of this argument see Sybel, TV, 
214-215. 
23Preamble and Articles 1,3,41 5,6,8, and 9 are the work 
of Biegleben with a few additions oy B1smarck and Blome. 
Articles 2,7,10, and 11 are the work of Bismarck. 
Bismarck said: "'Well, I never should have expected to 
find an Austrian diplomat who would put his name to that.•• 
See Clark, 290 and footnote. 
24For the complete provisions see Appendix B. 
Munster, 91. "Austrian diplomacy succeeded for the 
moment at Gastein in putting off the struggle. The Gastein 
Convention surprised all the world, standing, as it did, in 
direct opposition to Bismarck's demands." 
Clark, 297, considers it a triumph for Prussia. 
Carleton J.H. Hayes, Political ~ Social History£! 
Modern Europe. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1929, II, 
187. Considers it a triumph for Bismarck. 
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governor of Schleswig and Austria named Lieutenant Field 
Marshal Baron von Gablenz as governor of Holstein. The civil 
commissioners retained their positions with the exception of 
Baron Halbhuber who was replaced by Herr von Hofmann. Thus, 
the catastrophe that both Prussia and Austria had protested 
against and waged war in 1864 was accomplished, namely, the 
25 
separation of the two duchies. 
Finally, what were the effects of the treaty. In both 
Italy and France the treaty was regarded with distrust, and 
was censured openly in France by the government. At this same 
time the English fleet was recalled from the Mediterranean to 
take part in joint manoeuvres with the French fleet at Cher-
26 
bourg. But more interesting is the.attitude of the Diet 
27 
toward the treaty. As a rider to their propositions, the 
members of the Diet requested the two powers to inform the 
members of the intentions of the former with regard to the 
final disposition of the duchies, and whether an assembly of 
the Estates of Holstein and one of the Estates of Schleswig 
would be convoked. In reply to this the two powers submitted 
on August 24, the treaty of Gastein itself and added a state-
25 Mowat, 187. 
26Malet, 111-112. 
27nated March 27. See page 16. 
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ment that both Austria and Prussia were anxious for a definite 
solution and that the Diet could expect such a one. To this 
the Diet replied that the statement of the two powers had been\ 
unsatisfactory. This was followed by a motion which provided 
that a general assembly of the representatives of Holstein 
should be held, and secondly, that the Diet and the two powers 
should act together for the incorporation of Schleswig into the 
Confederation. On November 18, the Austria andPrussian re-
presentatives answered this motion in a manner tantamount to a 
refusal to permit the Diet to interfere with the actions of the 
28 
two powers with regard to the duchies. This reply of November 
is important because it was the last action participated in 
jointly by the two powers with regard to the solution of the 
question of the duchies. 
2~ Malet, 119-121. 
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CHAPTER II PRUSSIAN ATTEMPTS AT ALLIANCE 
The treaty of Gastein was only a truce, not a solution of 
the question. Prussia intended that she would possess the 
duchies some day. The February demands testify to the truth 
of this. How then, was Prussia to obtain possession of the 
duchies? Whatever means she decided to adopt, it would be 
necessary to have treaties of alliance in order to protect 
herself from aggression by either Italy or France. 
Bismarck first turned his attention to France. Immediate-
-
ly after the publication of the treaty, the French newspapers 
attacked it vehemently. This pleased Drouyn de Lhuys, the 
French Minister of Foreign Affairs, who favored Austriat and 
opposed a strengthening of the French alliance with Prussia. 
Napoleon III expressed his regret that the two powers had not 
done that which they had promised to do and for which they had 
fought Denmark, namely, to maintain the indivisible union of 
the two duchies. However, because of the conversations which 
took place between Goltz, the Prussian Ambassador at Paris, 
and Napoleon, the latter adopted a more friendly attitude. 
Goltz explained that the treaty of Gastein provided for a tem-
porary arrangement only in the administration of the duchies, 
and that it did not purport to effect a final solution of the 
1 
question of sovereignty. 
1 Sybel, IV, 230-236. 
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Meanwhile, Drouyn de Lhuys was doing what he could to 
weaken the cause of Prussia in France. He had had published 
in newspapers throughout Europe the circular letter of the 
French government to its ambassadors. This letter was dated 
August 29, 1865. It condemned the policy pursued by Prussia 
in very strong terms. This was followed by the publication of 
a despatch from Lord John Russell, dated September 14, in 
which Russell expressed similar views. The news of the pub-
lication of these two despatches was received with surprise in 
Berlin. However, the friendly attitude of France seemed as-
sured when Napoleon left for Biarritz on September 7. He was 
accompanied by Count Goltz and another Prussian diplomat, a 
son of General von Radawitz. 
Bismarck, also, at this time decided to go to Biarritz. 
He was interested in the attitude of France and he wanted to 
see for himself whether or not Napoleon was favorable to Prus-
sia. At this time, Bismarck was not worried about the atti-
tude of the German states. The reason for this was that these 
states were engaged in expressing their dissatisfaction with 
the course adopted by Austria when she came to a separate a-
2 
greement with Prussia. Austria had always been looked upon 
with favor by the German states, but this incident had de~ 
2 Sir James Wycliffe Headlam-Morley, Bismarck and the 
--Foundations ~ ~ German Empire. New York: G.P. Putnam's 
Sons, 1899, 240. 
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stroyed their esteem and confidence. Secondly, Bavaria, the 
strongest of the lesser states, might soon enlist on the side 
of Prussia because of this reversal in Austrian foreign pol-
icy. Bismarck, therefore, felt safe for the present with re-
gard to the relations of the German states and Prussia. In th 
meantime, Drouyn de Lhuys at the insistence of Napoleon had 
apologized in a private statement for the extremeness of the 
3 
French circular of August 29. Bismarck left for Biarritz on 
September 30 via Paris. He consulted with the Emperor until 
october 12, the date of the latter's departure. Bismarck 
remained in Biarritz for the rest of October. 
Previous to his departure from Berlin, BismarCk had had 
I 
conversations with Lefebvre de Bebain, the French char~~ 
affaires. He intimated to Lefebvre what promises he hoped to 
obtain from Napoleon with regard to a French alliance of some 
4 
sort. Before procee~ng directly to Biarritz, Bismarck 
stopped in Paris for a day where he first visited Rouher, the 
Minister of State, who was more friendly to a Prussian al-
liance for France than to an Austrian one. In order not to 
slight Drouyn de Lhuys, Bismarck visited him also. Drouyn 
3Ad.olphus Ward, Germa:gz, 1815-1890 (Cambridge Histol"ical 
Series, 8). New York: The Macmillan Company, 207. 
Correction of Sybel, IV, 242, line 3. Ward says that apology 
was not a despatch as stated in Sybel. 
4~. 
r 
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de Lhuys was very cordial toward Bismarck and explained that 
his hostile attitude had been the result of a fear that the 
duchies would be annexed to Prussia without compensation for 
France. He further suggested some possible advantages that 
might accrue to France, but said that he had no designs on 
Prussian or French territory. This intimation was similar to 
5 
that made by Lefebvre in Berlin. There is some evidence to 
indicate that Drouyn de Lhuys spread a rumor in France, at a 
later date, that Bismarck intended to make large extensions of 
6 
Prussian territory. 
On the second day of his stay in Biarritz, Bismarck was 
granted an interview with Napoleon. Napoleon was anxious to 
undo the damage done by the circular of August 29, and hast-
ened to explain that he did not always have complete knowledge 
of the details concerning foreign affairs. The Emperor was 
also anxious to know if there were any unpublished "commit-
ments" to the treaty of Gastein that would endanger France 
7 
and that guaranteed Venetia to Austria. But Bismarck as-
sured him that Prussia had no intention of placing Austria 
in a position where she could register a casus belli at will. 
At this juncture, Napoleon said that he had the best inten-
5sybel, IV, 244 ff. cites Bismarck's complete report 
dated October 24. This report contains all the information 
on the negotiations with France. 
6Ibid., 244, see footnote. This information was con-
tained-rn-a letter from Goltz dated October 23. 
7Mowat, 188. See also Sybel, IV, 245. 
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tiona to maintain the peace of Europe. Furthermore, he said 
that events should not be forced upon the world, but should be 
allowed to occur in the natural course of history. In other 
words, he did not want to take a definite step toward alliance 
until it was necessary. 
"'What are your views with regard to Holstein?'" was 
Napoleon •"s next question. "'We intend to annex it.'" Bi s-
marck, however, expressed the willingness of Prussia to in-
demnify Austria for Holstein. Napoleon raised no objection 
to this and approved of Bismarck's remarks to Drouyn de Lhuys 
with regard to a possible gain for France, However, Bismarck 
was not satisfied to end his conversation at that point. He 
continued to the effect that the acquisition of the duchies 
would not be an increase in Prussian power, but that it would 
be a burden to the Prussian government, especially with re-
gard to the defenses in the north and the increase in the 
navy that it would entail. However, this "'would be only 
earnest-money (arrhes) for the fulfillment of the task, which 
history had laid upon the State of Prussia, and for the fur-
ther prosecution of which we need to maintain friendly rela-
8 
tions with France.'" He added that a "vigorous Prussia will 
9 
naturally associate itself with France" and that France shoul 
be happy to encourage Prussia in her national growth. 
8Sybel, IV, 247, cites the report of Bismarck. 
9Mowat, 189. 
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In another conversation Napoleon queried whether or not 
the Danubian principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia might 
not be used as compensation to Austria for the cession of 
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venetia to Italy. Napoleon was still interested in Venetia 
because he was a partisan of the development of Italy as a 
national state. Bismarck replied that the only interest that 
prussia had in Wallachia and Moldavia was to avoid antagoniz-
ing Russia. In the latter manner, he managed with regard to 
the Venetian question to discourage the possibility of French 
support of Austria. Nepoleon made other remarks concerning 
the duties of nations to prevent the spread of disease from 
the Near East to Europe. After these conversations the Em-
peror left Biarritz and returned to Paris, but Bismarck stayedt 
On his return trip to Berlin in early November, 1865, 
Bismarck again talked with Napoleon. The discussions which 
had ensued at Biarritz were reviewed. Further, Napoleon re-
quested that William be informed that he believed that Prussia 
and France should proceed in a cautious manner in the matter 
of their relations and that it would be wiser to await develop-
ments. (This, Bismarck said, was the result of his tone to 
the Emperor although Napoleon was not aware of this unconscioue 
influence.) Napoleon added that as soon as circumstances 
seemed to demand a more formal agreement between the two 
powers the King should communicate with him. \V:hen this time 
came some definite agreement could be made. Napoleon also in-
r----------------------------------------4~3 
formed Bismarck that any agreement between France and Austria 
was not possible, and that he had informed Metternich of this 
before the treaty of Gastein had been concluded. This infor-
mation "showed with what reluctance Austria had entered into 
the Gastein compact, and what irregularities might be con-
ceivable in its execution." Bismarck returned to Berlin on 
November 7, and he was very much encouraged by the success of 
these negotiations. 
Probably one of the reasons why Napoleon acquiesced in 
Bismarck's plan was that he was interested in the develop-
ment of national states. "The division of Europe into large 
national states was what was meant by Napoleonic ideas; he 
was willing to help in Germany a change such as that he had 
10 
brought about in Italy." There are conjectures as to whether 
Bismarck and Napoleon discussed possible territorial gains 
for France. Drouyn de Lhuys had circulated the report, so it 
is said, that Bismarck had promised all kinds of compensations 
to France. It is true that Napoleon, later on in life, also 
maintained that Bismarck had made such promises. One thing 
is certain that if any promises were made, they concerned the 
possible addition of the territory of French-speaking peoples 
11 
and not Prussian or German territory. Bismarck's success 
satisfied him and upon his return to Berlin he was able to 
lOHeadlam-Morley, 241. 
11~., 243. 
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leave Sarre Louis, Coblenz, Luxemburg, and Cologne with only 
a small portion of their artillery and with a small force of 
landwehr to guard them. This would have been impossible had 
12 
he not been convinced of the good intentions of France. 
Napoleon, however, was not entirely convinced of the ability 
of the Prussian military forces to overcome those of Austria. 
It is quite possible that he intended to step in as arbiter 
when the two powers had exhausted themselves. No definite 
French alliance was ever concluded. But at a later date, 
13 
March 3, 1866 William wrote an autograph letter to Napoleon. 
'This had been suggested by Napoleon. This letter stated that 
the proper time had arrived for an understanding. Goltz and 
Napoleon discussed the terms, and again Napoleon suggested the 
annexation of some German territory. To this Prussia answered 
that she would not permit such annexation. However, if France 
annexed part of Belgium, then the Prussian frontier must in-
14 
elude the north-east of Belgium. And again, no alliance was 
made because Napoleon's neutrality seemed secure. The only 
object that Bismarck had in mind with regard to a possible 
alliance with France was to secure her neutrality. 
12Malet, 114. 
13Sy.bel, IV, 324. 
14Headlam-Morley, 248. 
After Bismarck had heard from Napoleon that Austria had 
attempted to conclude an alliance with France, he decided to 
attempt to come to some understanding with Italy. However, 
while he was at Biarri tz, the Italian government approached 
· Austria. Since 1859 there had been no diplomatic relations 
between Austria and Italy so La Marmora, the Italian premier 
and Minister of Foreign Affairs, gave this difficult task to 
count Malaguzzi of Modena. The Count was a patriotic Italian 
and at the same time a member of a noble family related to the 
royal family. His instructions were as follows: 
he was to propose to the Austrian govern-
ment the sale of Venetia (with Isonzo as 
boundary) for a thousand million lire, or 
four hundred million Austrian florins [or 
40,000,000 pounds]. Italy would then in 
addition to the payment of the money, con-
clude an advantageous commercial treaty with 
Austria, and preserve a conciliatory conduct 
toward the Pope; but she would also on her 
part, desire a further secret understanding, 
which might lead her to hope, under certain 
conditions• for the acquisition of the Ital-
ian Tyrollo 
The Count remained in Vienna for nearly two months and 
during that time he made as many contacts as possible with 
members of the Ministry, of the Press, and of the commercial 
world. The industrial world, the politicians, and the Minis-
ter of Finance were in favor of such a treaty with Italy. 
The government deficit was increasing every month, and the 
benefits that would accrue from the addition of four hun-
15aybel, IV, 270. 
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dred million florins were desirable to the Minister of Fi-
nance. The opposition was constituted by the clergy, who were 
opposed to the Italian King, by the army, and by the Emperor. 
If a government loan had not been negotiated, perhaps, this 
, alliance would have been concluded. However, Herr von Beeke, 
the agent of the chief of the department in the Ministry of 
Finance, who was Count Larish, negotiated a ninety million 
loan in silver at a high rate of interest. The Emperor re-
fused to cede Venetia: "Schleswig shall be abandoned only in 
return for an indemnification in land and people! Venetia 
shall be ceded only after a war that has brought honor to 
Austrian arms:• At first the Italians thought that this de-
claration was a warlike one, but when the Italian government 
received Malaguzzi's reports it reversed its opinion. These 
reports seemed to indicate that Austria did not contemplate 
_the overthrow of Italy, but that Austria would make no com-
mercial treaty, nor cede Venetia as a matter of military 
honor. Consequently, on November 25, La Marmora in a circular 
note to the Italian embassies stated that no commercial re-
lations with Austria could be engaged in without the intro-
duction of the question of Venetia. In the same note he sug-
gested that an improvement in trade across the frontier could 
be effected without diplomatic contrivances. Later, this was 
16 
accomplished through the mediation of Drouyn de Lhuys. 
16~., 285-287. 
r 
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But the rapprochement between Italy and Austria pro-
gressed no further. Instead Prussia seized the opportunity 
which Austria had neglected. Before Gastein Bismarck had sug-
gested that a commercial treaty between Ger.many and Italy 
might be concluded. However, because of the opposition of 
saxony and Bavaria, it was not concluded. After Gastein, it 
was a difficult question for these states to decide since 
Austria had adopted such a hostile attitude toward the con-
federation. In December, therefore, after the type of treaty 
had been decided upon, Prussia and Bavaria asked the govern-
ments of the zollverein for their acceptances. All but Han-
over accepted. B.Y this action these German states recognized 
the new kingdom of Italy. At the beginning of January, 1866 
Victor Emmanuel received the order of the Black Eagle from 
1? 
William. The news of the conclusion of this commercial 
treaty was received with great bitterness in Vienna. As a 
consequence, there were renewed outbreaks of trouble in Sch-
18 
leswig-Holstein. This oommercial treaty was not the end of 
negotiations between Prussia and Italy. Relations between 
Austria and Prussia became steadily worse. On January 13, 
1866 Bismarck wrote to Count Usedom in Florence. The sub-
stance of his remarks was: that since Austria had conducted 
affairs in the duchies contrary to the obligations incurred 
17~., 288. See also Headlam-Morley, 245. 
18For an account of the strained relations and the out-
breaks in Schleswig-Holstein consult Chapter III. 
r 48 by the treaty of Gastein, Prussia was free to resume her 
"natural relations with Italy." He also told Usedom that in 
the ultimate solution of the question between Austria and Prus\ 
sia that Italy would necessarily have a part. Bismarck con-
eluded his remarks by saying that if Italy did not join Prus-
19 
sia she(Prussia) would maintain the peace. 
Further inquiries were made at Florence, but no definite 
answer was received. After the famous Ministerial Council 
held in Berlin on February 28, plans were made to send 
Moltke on a mission to Florence. Meanwhile, both Italy and 
Prussia were anxious and distrustful of one another because 
"each feared that the other would use the alliance as a 
lever at Vienna, to get the Austrian government to make con-
20 
cessions without fighting." However, Yoltke's instructions 
were drawn up and were in final form by March 12, 1866. In 
order to keep Napoleon placated, the Prussians were careful 
to insist on the conditional character of the proposed 
treaty with Italy, that is, in case Prussia were attacked. In 
event of war the instructions provided that Prussia would ob-
tain a position in North Germany according to the Imperial 
Constitution of 1849; that Italy would receive Venetia, but 
would not be permitted to take any Confederate territory, in 
Trieste, nor Tyrol. If Italy would not agree to this, then 
19Headl~-Morley, 246. 
20:u:owat, 156. 
\ 
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it would be best to conclude a simple treaty of friendship. 
yoltke was about to depart for Florence when word came that 
La Marmora was sending an Italian general to Berlin for the 
same purpose. Consequently, it was decided that it would be 
advisable for Moltke to remain in Berlin. 
Previously on February 28, Nigra, the Italian Minister 
at Paris, had spoken with Napoleon. There had been a revolu-
tion in Bucharest on February 24, and this seemed like an op-
portunity to offer Austria the Danubian principalities in ex-
change for Venetia. Nigra approached Napoleon with this sug-
gestion. But the latter had given his approval only on con-
dition that the proposed Italo-Prussian alliance should be 
concluded. Consequently, Usedom, upon La Marmora's orders, 
sent a telegram to Bismarck stating that Italy intended to 
send an officer to Berlin, if this arrangement was agreeable. 
This telegram and one from Bismarck (telling of Moltke's mis-
sion to Florence) crossed in transit. The Italians thought 
that Bismarck's telegram was a response to the Italian tele-
gram. General Govone, therefore, was summoned from Perugia 
to obtain his instructions. _\fter Bismarck realized what had 
occurred he sent his consent to the mission of Govone. 
La Marmora had no intention of concluding an alliance 
with Prussia. What he desired was to scare APstria with the 
possibility of such an alliance. In this way he hoped to 
l __ r_o_r_c_e_h_e...;;r_t_o...;...c_e_d....;e;.....V_e_n_e_t_i_a.;..:;..i_n_r_e_t_u_r_n_f_o_r_Rum _ a_n_i_a_. __ Go_v_o_n_e_, __ _, L 21Sybel, IV, 330-332. 
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therefore, according to his instructions was to sound out the 
Prussian sentiment with regard to contemplated military opera-
tions against Austria. If Prussia wanted an alliance for the 
declaration of war against Austria, then La Marmora hoped to 
be able to force Austria to cede Venetia to Italy. 
Govone arrived in Berlin on March 14, ostensibly to study 
22 
the system of fortifications. Together with count Barral, the 
Italian Minister to Berlin, he visited Bismarck. Govone told 
Bismarck that the purpose of Italy in subscribing to this pro-
posed alliance was to effect a solution in the Venetian ques-
tion. If such a basis could be found, then he would discuss 
the military arrangements which would be necessary between 
the two powers. To this Bismarck replied: 
that the Holstein question which was at 
issue between Prussia and Austria was not 
sufficient to warrant a declaration of war; 
and that therefore Prussia intended to 1~ 
at the basis of her future action the na-
tional question of the reform of the Ger-
man Confederation; that in the desirable 
promulgation of these doctrines several 
months would still necessarily be consumed; 
and that in order to have a safer basis to 
work upon, Prussia proposed a treaty to the 
Italian Government, in which Italy should en-
gage to declare war against Austria so soon 
as Prussia should take up arms in the cause 
of Confederate reformi3 
This, however, served to reenforce the suspicions of the 
Italians against Prussia, but Govone decided to stay in Ber-
lin and perhaps conclude a treaty of friendship. But, at 
22Mowat, 156. 
23sybel, IV, 337. 
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this time there arrived in Italy, news of the disapproval of 
England, Russia, and Austria to the proposed exchange ~ Ru-
mania to Austria, for the cession of Venetia to Italy. Second~ 
lY• affairs between Austria and Prussia had increased the prob-
ability ~war. In view of these two facts, it was decided to 
accept Bismarck's plan, but to limit its binding force to three 
24 
months. On April a, after several conferences to obviate the 
difficulties, an offensive and defensive alliance between Prus-
25 
sia and Italy was signed, and a week later it was ratified. 
Bismarck had succeeded not only in securing an alliance with 
Italy, but by virtue of this alliance he had prevented a hos-
tile attack by Napoleon because the latter, as the protector 
of ItalY, would not fight Prussia as long as she was allied 
with Italy. 
It can be observed that the relations of the four powers, 
France, Italy, Austria, and Prussia with regard to alliances 
26 
depended upon Venetia. Italy would not be secure until she 
obtained Venetia; Napoleon, as the protector of Italy and in 
order to redeem his promises, wished to prevent a reconcilia-
tion between Austria and Prussia; Bismarck was anxious to pre-
vent the cession by Austria of Venetia so that Austria would 
be unable to obtain French or Italian support; finally, Aus-
24ward, 216. 
25see Appendix c. 
26
neadlam-Morley, 243-245. 
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tria refused to cede Venetia unless she was guaranteed com-
pensation in Silesia, but this William would not do. It may 
be said that if Austria had ceded Venetia, the war of 1866 
might not have been fought. Belcredi, the Emperor, Ester-
hazy, and the Archduchess Sophie opposed the cession of Ven-
27 
etia. 
2
'clark, 30?. 
CHAPTER III LEADING TO WAR 
According to the treaty of Gastein, the administration 
of Holstein by Austria and of Schleswig by Prussia began on 
September 15. Both Manteuffel and Gablenz published proclgma-
1 
tiona on this date. Manteuffel had visited both duchies 
shortly after the conclusion of the treaty. After he assumed 
his duties of governor of Schleswig he had some trouble with 
the government in Berlin concerning the appointment of of-
ficials and appropriations of money. In several speeches to 
the people he had mentioned the possibility of the cession of 
Schleswig to Prussia; by some he was praised for this, by 
others censured. However, it was generally agreed that Man-
teuffel was a strong and honest man. 
When Gablenz began his administration of Holstein, he 
regulated his actions according to the strict orders that he 
had received from Vienna. "The instructions given to the new 
Statthalter revealed the desire of the Austrian government to 
preserve its 'pawn'--Holstein--from 'deterioration,• so that 
it could later be handed over either to Prussia or to the 
Diet, according to circumstances at the proper time." He was 
further instructed to conduct himself differently than Halb-
huber had. Thirdly, he was to treat Augustenburg as a pri-
2 
vate citizen. The relations between the two governors were 
lsee Appendix D. 
2 Clark, 315-316. 
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quite friendly, and it seemed that affairs in the duchies 
would proceed quitely and amicably. On October 14, the 
Prince of Augustenburg visited his cousin near Eckernforde in 
Schleswig. His arrival was known beforehand, and acts of hom-
age were paid him both on his arrival and his departure. Man-
teuffel protested this action to Gablenz, and the Prussian 
government protested it to the government at Vienna. The pro-
test of Prussia asked that the Prince should be forbidden to 
accept such demonstrations even in Holstein. This request 
was granted by the Austrian government, and Mensdorff com-
municated with Gablenz. The communication ordered Gablenz 
not to tolerate any such demonstrations. In general, however, 
during the autumn of 1865 friendly relations were maintained 
between the two governors and the two governments. 
However, in the beginning of October the opinion of the 
crown lawyers in connection with the question of succession 
3 
in the duchies was published. This decision is supposed 
never to have been communicated to Austria. It was at this 
same time, October, 1865, that Bismarck was visiting in 
4 
Biarritz, but he returned to Berlin in November full of new 
schemes against Austria and plans to gain the duchies. He 
3Malet, 122. See also, Sir Henry Montague Rozier, ~ 
Seven Weeks' War. London: Macmillan and Company, 186?, 
~ I, 19. Sybel~akes no mention of the publication of the 
I report. On pages 158-165, he gives the contents of it. l -------4--se_e __ p_a_g_e_s __ 3_?_-_4_4_·------------------------------------~ 
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gave carte-blanche to the Prussian press to retaliate a-
gainst the Austrian press. To Chetek, the Austrian charge/ 
at Berlin, he said: "'There cannot exist between Austria 
and Prussia a half-relationship. Either sincere alliance 
5 
or war to the knife.'" 
Meanwhile in the duchies the Augustenburg agitation had 
increased, especially in Holstein, and propaganda began to 
reappear. Manteuffel took measures to prohibit the sale of 
newspapers in Schleswig that were friendly to Augustenburg. 
On December 6, he wrote to Biamarck stating that the con-
dition of affairs in Holstein was similar to that existing 
6 
before Gastein. The attitude of Gablenz had changed, and 
in many instances he made declarations hostile to Prussia. 
The Princess Frederick, the wife of the Hereditary Prince, 
journeyed from Altona to Kiel, and along the way she was 
greeted with royal honors. All these and similar occur-
rences in Holstein seemed to indicate that the pre-Gastein 
situation had returned. Yanteuffel began to lose patience. 
On December 14, he dined with Gablenz. A long interview be-
tween Manteuffel, Gablenz, and Hofmann ensued. Gablenz and 
Hofmann told Manteuffel that Austria would guard her posi-
tion in Holstein in order to protect her place in German af-
fairs which place Prussia was trying to usurp. 
5clark, 324. 
6Ibid., 316-320. Clark states that there was no change, 
but thar-Gablenz had followed his instructions and that the 
Austrian policy of neutrality had been explained to Prussia. 
~ 
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After the incidents concerned with the journey of the 
Princess, Manteuffel sent a protest to Gablenz. The latter 
replied that even at the moment he was inquiring of the 
Vienna government if it was permissible for him to inform the 
Prussian government of the administrative measures enforced 
in Holstein. After this reply, Manteuffel reported to Bis-
marck that it seemed advisable to question Vienna whether or 
not that government would break with Prussia or with Augustan-
burg. Accordingly, Werther, the Prussian Minister at Vienna, 
was instructed on December 29, 1865 to question Mensdorff. 
The instructions said that he was to point out 
how very contradictory it was to the agree-
ments of Salzburg and Gastein to permit such 
demonstrations, and to suffer them to go un-
punished; that the administration of the Duch-
ies was divided, but the sovereignty was held 
in common as before; that each of the two 
Powers was, in the Duchy intrusted to her, the 
depositary of the other's rights; that there-
fore Prussia was justified in demanding that 
Austria should in Holstein prove herself worthy 
of the confidence placed in her at Salzburg 
and Gastein, and should now, after two inef-
fectual warnings, make the Hereditary Prince 
feel that she, as well as Prussia, was deter-
mined to support the common righta7 
Before these instructions reached Werther, Bismarck on 
December 31, received his answer from Hofmann who was return-
ing to Holstein from Vienna by w~ of Berlin. Hofmann re-
iterated what he and Gablenz had told Manteuffel, namely, 
l ________ 7_s_y_b_e_l_, __ rv __ , __ 29_4 __ • ______________________________________ -J 
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8 
that the laws of 1854 had been abrogated and that Augustenburg 
bore the title of Duke rightfully. He also said that if Prus-
sia complained of the Angustenburg agitation in the newspapers 
that Austria could as justly oppose the journals in Schleswig 
that were agitating for annexation to Prussia. However, he 
did state that Austria had no desire to cause friction between 
prussia and herself, but that a common policy would be the 
only one that would lead to any mutual understanding. 
With the new year, Gablenz received instructions similar 
to those he had received in September. On .January 3, Bismarck 
received a communication from Werther stating that Mensdorff 
had expressed his desire for amicable relations, that con-
cerning the Constitution of 1854 he was not quite sure, but 
that he (Mensdorff) wished that Prussia would be more sym-
pathetic with the occurrences in the duchies. However, in 
spite of this friendly attitude Manteuffel had been urging 
Bismarck to demand the removal of Augustenburg because he felt 
that was the only way in which a satisfactory solution could 
be effected. On .January 18, he wrote to this effect to Bis-
marck. But previous, Bismarck had already started such ne-
gotiations. On .January 13, he had written to Usedom concern-
ing the Italian alliance. In this letter he mentioned the in-
tentions of Prussia in connection with the new conditions in 
Germany. 
8The Constitution of 1854 which had been annulled by the 
Confederate commissioners in 1864. 
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Meanwhile in Holstein, the popularity of the Augustenburg 
caused more demonstrations in his favor. The climax of these 
was reached on January 23. The Austrian government had been 
informed of a proJect to assemble the delegates of the Holstei 
and Schleswig associations. The Vienna cabinet issued a note 
of warning, but it was assured that any "agitating questions" 
would not be discussed. Consequently, the Austrian government 
9 
did not forbid the Assembly. This mass-meeting at which four 
thousand people were present was held on January 23 at Altona. 
In keeping with the promises to the Austrian government, no 
resolutions were passed, but there were loud clamorings in 
favor of Augustenburg, and expressions of favor concerning 
the possible convocation of the assembly of the Estates. By 
permitting this meeting to take place, Gablenz was guilty of 
an error of judgment. Bismarck himself was not concerned par-
ticularly because he could see no disastrous effects. However, 
he did not overlook this opportunity to lodge another com-
10 
plaint at Vienna. This complaint was presented on January 26 
in a letter to Werther. The general tenor of the despatch was 
as follows: that the two powers had tought against revolu~ 
tionary tendencies in the past and it was ill-befitting that 
Austria should support such measures against Prussia. Austria 
9Malet, 123. 
10clark, 327. See also Sybel, IV, 304, wherein he states 
that there was a great deal of apprehension in Prussia. I am 
inclined to believe Clark. 
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was asked to put an end to these events in Holstein and to 
reply in a positive fashion to Frusta. This answer would as-
sist Prussia in determining her policy. Whether or not it 
was to be one of freedom from that of Austria would depend 
upon this answer. The points covered in this despatch were 
not new to Mensdorff, save one, "the solemn and official re-
quest for an answer quite as official and as definitive, as 
to whether Austria would choose to renounce her support of 
Augustenburg or her friendly alliance with Prussia." 
The Austrians raiized the seriousness of this note. 
Mensdorff expressed his disapproval of the Altona meeting, 
and he had already sent a reproof to Gablenz for permitting 
it. At the same time, however, he maintained that Austria 
could not interfere with the freedom of the press in Holstein, 
and secondly, that both powers had agreed to recognize Augus-
11 
tenburg by the motion of May 28, 1864. These were his unof-
ficial words; but they became the basis for the official Aus-
trian reply which was dated February 7, 1866. 
Without adducing any proofs, it was denied 
that the agitation in Holstein had a revolu-
tionary character--an assertion that could not, 
indeed, be gainsaid, if Austria seconded the 
deductions of Beust and Pfordten concerning 
Augustenburg, which, however, would mean that 
she cut loose from the basis of the Vienna 
and the Gastein treaties. 'Prussia,' it was 
said in the reply, 'has, in making her com-
plaints about the Altona meeting, evidently 
forgotten that it was her own Government that 
once rejected the proposal of Austria to bring 
forward in the Confederation a motion prohib-
llneclaration made in common at the London Conference. 
iting all such meetings throughout Germany. 
Austria recognizes her duty of preserving 
uninjured the pledge that has been intrusted 
to her care, but can understand this duty 
only upon its own promptings, and it con-
siders every single question that may come 
up within the range of its administration 
as a question arising solely between itself 
and its Statthalter, and in every way re-
moved from the reach of foreign interference. 
The same independence is also recognized and 
conceded to the Royal Prussian Government in 
Schleswig. • • • . 
'Count Mensdorff has, without doubt, the 
right to confide to his friend Baron von Wer-
ther, what the Govetnment of the :Emperor 
thinks about the authorization of that Al-
tona meeting, to which, moreover, the courct 
of Berlin seems to attach altogether too 
much importance. But the Minister of the 
Emperor must decidedly refuse to recognize 
the claim of the Royal Prussian Ambassador 
to any justification of an act that con-
cerned the administration of Holstein. When 
I give utterance to these sentiments, I am 
but following the commands of my Imperial 
Master. •12 
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This reply seems to have been given for the benefit of the pub 
lie because Karolyi, in a private conversation, and under or-
ders from Mensdorff apologized for this meeting at Altona • 
. ~stria, however, had adopted a firm stand and could not re-
13 
tract. Bismarck made no official reply to the Austrian note 
of February 7, but at a meeting with Karolyi he remarked that 
12sybel, IV, 308-309, cites Mensdorff's note. See also 
Malet, 128-129 for a good summary of it. Rozier, 21 has 
erred in the date of the note. 
13clarkr 334-336, mentions this private apology. 
Sybel, IV, 3u9, mentions the meeting with Karolyi but does 
not allude to any apology. 
' l 
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the relations of Austria and Prussia had lost their intimate 
character. In other words in accordance with his note of 
January 26 addressed to Austria, "'that convinced of the im-
possibility of longer acting with Austria, Prussia resumed her 
14 
liberty of action, and would only consult her own interests.'" 
These notes definitely mark the end of the Austro-Prussian al-
liance, and the beginning of hostilities which eventually lead 
to the war of 1866. Also, any further altercations or ne-
gotiations between Austria and Prussia with regard to the 
duchies were linked with the broader question of war and re-
form of the Confederation. The question of the duchies was no 
longer considered exclusively. 
Bismarck spoke of the imminence of war to those people 
who would be sure to spread this rumor in Austria. He also 
fostered agitations and outbursts of indignation in the Prus-
15 
sian newspapers. How did Austria react to the recurrence of 
the pre-Gastein relations? The Emperor had determined to 
yield no further, and for four reasons: first, public opinion 
favored Austria's stand; secondly, the policy of Bismarck it-
self; thirdly, the improvement in Austria's internal affairs 
and in her international position; fourth, the influence 
exerted by the military and Court circles in Vienna. It was 
14Malet, 130. 
15clark, 336. 
at this time that he turned a deaf ear to the plans for a 
16 
rapprochem~ with Italy. 
-
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In Vienna on February 21 a Council was held to determine 
what policy Austria should adopt in view of these new develop-
ments, namely, the situation created by the exchange of notes. 
"To the menaces of Monsieur de Bismarck, the Emperor and his 
council had decided to reply, not with armaments [at least, 
not immediately] nor yet with concessions, but by showing their 
teeth to Prussia and bestowing their glances on the Mittel-
17 
staaten." And again, at this Council the Emperor refused to 
cede Venetia and thus gain Italy as an ally. Esterhazy and 
Belcredi urged the rapprocbment with the secondary states. 
This, however, had already begun. On February 11, Mensdorff 
had instructed Blome at Munich to discover confidentially if 
the guess of Bismarck with regard to Bavaria was correct, name-
ly, that she would stall off entering the war until she could 
determine which was the winning side and then she would ally 
herself with that side. This conjecture seemed to be a correct 
one. On the other hand, Saxony, under the leadership of Beust, 
18 
was in favor of strong measures to be adopted by the Diet. 
Meanwhile in Prussia, Bismarck was contemplating the 
possibilites of a reform in the Confederation. This idea had 
been in his mind for a number of years, but it was necessary to 
16Ibid., 328-332. See also pages 45-47. 
17 Ibid., 339-340. 
18 Ibid. 
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to attack the solution of this question with caution. He 
realized that in order to accomplish this reform, a war would 
be necessary. On this point he had to meet the opposition of 
the King who would not go to war on a small pretext, but his 
reasons for adopting a warlike policy would have to be sound 
and well established. B.Y family and by sentiment he was drawn 
toward Austria and away from Napoleon. Consequently, Bismarck 
proceeded in a judicious manner in order to lead William into 
a frame of mind which was favorable to war. 
In the early part of February Bismarck instructed Prince 
Reuss to communicate to Pfordten the Prussian messages of 
19 
January 20 and January 26 that had been sent to Austria. 
Pfordten replied favorably to Prussia's attitude as it was in-
dicated in these despatches. On February 2? in his conversa-
tion with Pfordten, Reuss brought up the question of Federal 
reform. The latter agreed that Prussia was entitled to an in-
crease in power. He also said that the voting power of the 
Diet as it existed then was a mistake and that the apportion-
ment of votes should be based on the actual power of the mem-
bers. With regard to Schleswig-Holstein he said he could not 
answer definitely until he could determine the motive for Aus-
tria's attitude. "If she opposed the Prussian Court for the 
19on January 20, Bismarck had reviewed the situation in 
Holstein in a letter to Werther. He wished to suppress the 
secret societies and the press. 
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sake of Augustenburg, then she was right. If she wished only 
to hinder the Prussian annexation, she ought not to expect 
others to join her." If it came to a decision, he would pre-
fer Prussian annexation to any other course, so he said. Whil 
these events were in progress, the question of Venetia and the 
possibilities of alliances were discussed in France, Prussia, 
Austria, and Italy. 
In February the negotiations for alliances that Prussia 
had been conducting did not seem favorable to her so a full 
Ministerial Council was called for February 28 to discuss the 
situation. The King presided at the council which was at-
tended by the Crown Prince, Bismarck, Goltz, Manteuffel• Molt-
ke, and others. The meeting was opened by the King who made a 
short speech saying that the affairs in Holstein were only 
one indication of Austria's intention to keep Prussia in 
second position if she could. He further remarked that "the 
possession of the Duchies is the national desire of all Prus-
sia. That a war was to come was certain, but Prussia would 
have to be careful not to provoke the war herself. Bismarck 
gave the historical background of the diplomatic conflict 
with Austria and concluded his remarks by saying that the rup-
ture had already been effected by his remarks to Karolyi upon 
receipt of the Austrian note of February 7. Most of the min-
isters favored Bismarck and his plans. Goltz reported on Nape-
leon's favorable attitude, and Moltke reported on the military 
65 
status of Prussia. The Crown Prince gave a dissenting opinion 
He had never favored any but amicable relations between the 
two German powers, and said: "The war, with Austria is a war 
between brothers; and the interference of the Foreign Powers 
is certain." The decision, however, was in the hands of the 
King. He said that the possession of the duchies was sufti~ 
cient cause for a war, but that if the question could be set-
tled peacefully it would be wise. 
The decision, whether it shall be war or 
peace, depends therefore, upon Austria's 
further conduct. On the part of Prussia, 
diplomatic negotiations alone can for the 
present be undertaken, in order to secure 
for her the most favorable chances in the 
event of war~O 
The King was also of the opinion that the question of the 
duchies was bound up with the question of the reforms in the 
Confederation. One of the results of this Council was the 
renewal of efforts to make alliances with France and Italy. 
It was at this time that the King sent his autograph letter 
to Napoleon, and that Moltke's instructions for his mission 
to Italy were framed. 
Karolyi in his reports to Vienna indicated the hostile 
attitude which was manifest in Berlin. These reports alarmed 
Mensdorff. The feeling in Vienna against Prussia was also 
rising every day, and Mensdorff was finding it more difficult 
to deal with the militarists. When news came that Prussia 
20sybel, IV, 323. 
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bad called out the militia the Austrians feared that war was 
at hand. This, however, was not an extraordinary event, but 
nevertheless, the Austrians were alarmed. On March 2, orders 
were sent to six cavalry regiments and six batteries to be 
prepaxed for action. 
A Council of war was held in Vienna between March 7 and 
21 
March 13. The entire military situation was discussed. The 
extent of the· strength of Austria was compared with that of 
22 
Prussia, and was found to be superior. Austria, as well as 
Prussia, wished to ally the question of the duchies with the 
question of the reform of the Confederation. At this time 
Beust sent news to Vienna of Bismarck's retort to Countess 
Hohenthal when she asked if it were true that he wished to 
23 
fight Austria and thus conquer Saxony. After this Council, 
Austria's preparations were pushed, but secretly. This was an 
unfortunate move for Austria because as soon as she did this 
she was committed to war and to Bismarck. Prussia's military 
machine was much better organized; could mobilize more quickly; 
and Bismarck could always maintain that it was Austria who 
21Hozier, 25, says March 10. 
22rbid., 26. Sybel makes no mention of these miscalcula-
tions or-the Austrian Council. 
23sybel, ·IV, 344-345, has the best account of this in-
cident, but it is mentioned in all references. 
l 
24 
had started to prepare. 
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Events occurred in rapid succession. On March 3 Karolyi 
presented at Berlin a statement from Austria to the e~ct that 
Austria would not permit her position in the provisional 
government to be jeopardized, nor her position in ·the Con-
federation. Similar statements were presented to the govern-
25 
mente of France and England. 
However, during all these plans for war, Mensdorff who 
favored peace had decided on a peace offensive. It consisted 
of two parts: first, that a dualism between the two poers 
should be established in the Confederation; and secondly, 
it provided for a German national movement, or to be more 
definite, the question of the duchies and the question of the 
reform of the Confederation were to be linked together. 
Stated differently, his plan was to wage a peace campaign 
against Bismarck, and if this failed, to wage a diplomatic 
war by taking the Schleswig-Holstein question to the Federal 
Diet, and finally to make an alliance with "l'infame" in 
Paris. He wished to conduct his peace offensive in such a 
way that it would be 11 'impossible for Bismarck to register a 
casus belli. ' 11 In this manner Mensdorff hoped not only to 
avoid war, but to make it impossible for Bismarck to remain 
24Headlam-Morley, 247. 
25:Malet, 130. 
26 
in office. 
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As part of his peace procedure he offered on March 3, to 
reopen negotiations with regard to Schleswig-Holstein. On 
March 15, he is supposed to have stated that the duchies shoul 
be independent under Prussian influence, and that the Grand 
nuke of Oldenburg was an acceptable candidate. Again on March 
27, he said to Gramont, the French Minister in Vienna that 
'he cared little what accession of ter-
ritory Prussia gained outside of Ger-
many; and that he would consent to an-
nexation of Schleswig if absolutely 
necessary to avoid war, but Holstein 27 
must be independent in the Confederation.' 
These peaceful advances, however, were too late. 
While Mensdorff was making his peaceful advances to re-
store harmony, a decree in the name of the king of Prussia was 
issued on March 11. This decree may be regarded as a reply 
to Karolyi's communication of March 3. It provided for the 
punishment by imprisonment "with hard labour for any attempt 
within the Schleswig-Holstein territory, calculated to im-
pair his own Willi-am'-s or the .Emperor of Austria's sovereign 
28 
rights." The implications in this decree were meaningful 
because Prussia, ~ccording to the treaty of Gastein, had no 
26clark, 349-354. This plan was not original with Mens-
dorff but seems to have been suggested in 1864 by others. 
This was the only reference to these plans that were found in 
my research, but this work has authority and was written from 
Austrian state documents. 
27Ibid., 358. There is no mention of these proposals in 
the books which favor Prussia. 
28Malet, 130-131. 
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right to interfere in Holstein. 
29 
her disregard for this treaty. 
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When she did this, she showed 
Naturally, this caused alarm 
in Vienna. Consequently, Mensdorff instructed Karolyi to 
make an interpellation at Berlin, whether Prussia intended to 
break the Gastein convention and to disturb the peace. Bis-
marck replied: "No." In answer to a question about Prussia's 
preparations for war, Bismarck answered that she was conduct-
ing no such preparations. To which Karolyi answered that the 
Austrian preparations were merely for defense and protection. 
The sending of troops into Bohemia, and this interpellation of 
Bismarck are regarded as examples of precipitate action by Aus 
tria. The second was foolhardy because Bismarck could hardly 
have answered affirmatively. 
On March 16, the same day that he had sent instructions 
to Karolyi, Mensdorff sent a secret circular despatch to all 
the German governments. The purpose of this circular was to 
state what would be done if Bismarck's reply was unsatisfactor 
According to this despatch, the Diet was to be called to make 
a decision with regard to Schleswig-Holstein. If Prussia op-
posed this, then the Confederate army with the exception of the 
Prussian contingents was to be mobilized. However, when Bis-
marck replied so emphatically to Karolyi, the need for the 
despatch was unfounded. Therefore, on March 18, Mensdorft 
telegraphed the secondary states that the Prussian answer had 
been satisfactory. The despatch of March 16 and the telegram 
29sybel, IV, 348. 
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of March 18 had been sent to the following capitals of states: 
Munich in Bavaria, Dresden in Saxony, Hanover, Stuttgart in 
30 
\~rtemberg, Karlsruhe in Baden, Cassel, and Darmstadt. 
The possibility of war was imminent, but still William 
was opposed. The Absolutist party headed by the Dowager 
queen was also against it. In Austria, the Emperor had just 
refused to cede Venetia for one million lire. And, to in-
crease the war scare in Austria, Karolyi had informed his 
31 
government that he considered war inevitable. On March 24t 
the Prussian government sent a circular despatch to all the 
German governments. Bismarck protested the movements of the 
Austrian army and said that it was necessary for Prussia to 
protect herself. He asked if the assistance of the members 
of the Confederation could be guaranteed in case Prussia would 
be attacked. At this time he made his first announcement of 
32 
his proposal for a reformed Confederation. Moltke states in 
a confidential note dated March 24 that this despatch sent by 
Bismarck was a pretext. He declared that all the Austrian 
preparations had been defensive and not offensive at least up 
36clark, 370, corrects Sybel, IV, 350. Sybel states that 
Mensdorff countermanded the presentation of the despatch 
but Clark says he did not, nor did these states warn Austria 
but instead sent warnings to Berlin. 
31Malet, 138. 
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33 
to that date. Thus both powers had addressed notes to the 
other states indicating what might be expected if a peaceful 
solution were not found. 
A Ministerial Council was held in Berlin on March 27 
and the King presided. As a result on March 28 and 29 de-
crees were issued for military reenforcements. In particular 
34 
it was decided to arm the Silesian and Elbe fortresses. 
Meanwhile, the Italian enboys had observed these events and 
the treaty with Italy was signed on April 8. 
The movement for a reform in the confederation had been 
in Bismarck's mind for some time. His announcement of it on 
March 24 was a result of long deliberations. As early as 
February 14, he had broached the subject to Pfordten. The 
latter had maintained an attitude of friendliness to Prussia 
for some time, and Bismarck encouraged the friendly relations 
between the two states. On March 8, Reuss told Pfordten that 
Prussia was contemplating a revision of the Constitution of 
the confederation and that Prussia intended to move to summon 
a German parliament which should be composed of members 
elected directly by the people. Pfordten asserted that he was 
33Headlam-Morley, 249. 
34sybel, IV, 351. Other provisions were "to purchase 
horses for half of the Prussian field-artillery, and to in-
crease seventy-five battalions, each from 530 to 685 men 
(their full war-footing would have been 1002). The increase 
of the force by this means amounted to 11 1 000 men, which was 
almost exactly the same number that the Austrian provinces 
on the frontier had received by the changes that had been 
made." 
?2 
friendly to this, but said that Prussia would have to come to 
som understanding with Austria. Bismarck, however, had plans 
to offer Bavaria the military supremacy of the south German 
states. In this way he hoped to destroy any Austrian senti-
ments that might be harbored by Pfordten. The circular of 
March 24 when it was sent to Bavaria was accompanied by a 
lengthy explanation of the new parliamentary system which 
35 
Bismarck desired to initiate. 
Austria, on the other hand, had not been idle with regard 
to the German states. Mensdorff, as part of his peace offen-
sive, wanted Bavaria and Saxony jointly to make a motion in 
the Diet to preserve peace. Pfordten was asked to take the 
initiative, but he refused because his connections with Prus-
sia were too friendly. Secondly he was busy with his own 
36 
peace plans. To Pfordten his most important task was to gain 
safety, influence, and prestige for Bavaria. In order to do 
this, therefore, it was necessary that the rivalry between 
the two powers should be sustained but that this rivalry 
should be kept within peaceful limits. Consequently, for the 
sake of the state which he served, if for no other reason, 
37 
Pfordten was sincere in his efforts to preserve peace. 
When the Schleswig-Holstein question had come to the fore, 
35Ibid., 360-363. 
36clark, 3?0. l _______ 3_7_s_y_b_e_l_, __ I_v_, __ 3-64 __ ·---------------------------------------J 
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ne had vacillated in his policy, but finally he had decided 
tnat the cause of the trouble was Austria's attitude. He be-
lieved that aside from Augustenburg's rights, the best solu-
tion of the question would be found in the annexation of the 
duchies by Prussia. Austria, he declared, opposed this in 
order to reap advantages for herself. He became convinced that 
war between the two powers was almost inevitable, and if that 
war came, it would mean the destruction of the Confederation. 
This he wished to avoid. As a result of his wish to maintain 
the Confederation, he began to outline a plan for the reorgan-
ization of the Confederation. Pfordten was supported in this 
policy by the Bavarian King Ludwig. This plan provided for a 
three-fold division of the confederation, with Austria remain-
38 
ing in the Bund. This was his reply to Bismarck's circular 
despatch of March 24. 
Previously, on March 26, Pfordten had surprised Blome 
with the following proposal which was to serve as a basis of 
his mediation between the two powers. 
'Prussia to accept Augustenburg and a modi-
fication of the February demands, Austria to 
allow a new allotment of voting power in the 
Diet in accord with Prussia's actual strength, 
and to per.mit Prussia to exercise a preponder-
ant influence in North Germany.t39 
This proposal, however, was never given any serious consider-
ation by either power. 
if 
3BMQwat, 190, SaYS that this plan had great possibilities, Pruss1a had accepted it. 
39clark, 3?1, cites letter to Mensdorff, dated March 26. 
?4 
Meanwhile, Austria was criticized for her troop movements 
in the north. Therefore, in order to maintain her position as 
desiring peace, a very vigorous peace campaign supplemented 
the diplomatic campaign. This plan had three parts: first, 
to challenge Prussia to announce that her intentions were 
peaceful and to give an explanation of her preparations; 
secondly, to continue to seek alliances; thirdly, to weaken 
the position of Bismarck. 
The first of these was carried into effect on March 31. 
Mensdorff instructed Karolyi to address a note to the Prussian 
government in which Austria disclaimed ho ::tile intentions 
and in which the Emperor refused to put himself in a position 
40 
of opposition to Article XI of the Act of Confederation. 
This same note ended with a request that Prussia would declare 
her intentions to preserve peace. As a consequence of this 
41 
note, a series of notes between the two governments ensued 
with the result that they agreed to recall their military 
42 
forces. The Prussian reply, dated April 6, was equivalent to 
a request for an explanation of Austria's military preparation 
40see Appendix H. 
41 sybel, IY,384-389, gives a detailed description of 
each note. Clark, 375, mentions subsequent notes in footnotes 
42Letter from William to Bismarck, April 3, sayin~ that 
proposed reply to Austria is too brusque. Letter of B1smarck 
to William, April 3, saying that it would not be advisable to 
modify the proposed reply. 
43 
in Bohemia. The other Prussian notes bear the dates of A-
pril 15 and 21, while the AUstrian notes are dated April 7 
and 18. The crucial note was the reply of Prussia on A-
44 
pril 21 in which that g~rnment engaged to reduce her army 
75 
by the extent to which it had been increased by the orders of 
March 29. This was to be done as soon as Austria withdrew 
her troops from the north, and would be done in proportion to 
the Austrian reduction in war equipment. The latter was to 
use her influence on the secondary states to stop their mili-
tary preparations. 
The second part of Mensdorff's vigorous peace campaign, 
45 
namely, to secure alliances has been discussed elsewhere. 
But the third part is very interesting, and if it had suc-
ceeded, its effects would have been far-reaching. This pro-
vided for the weakening of Bismarck's position and was designe 
46 
to drive him from office. It is known as the Coburg Intrigue. 
43It is well to remember that the treaty with Italy was 
signed on April 8. 
Malet, 160, has the dates of these events in March 
rather than in April. Seems to have been a printer's error. 
44 see page 76. Letter of William to Bismarck, April 20, 
stating that Austrian plan was to be accepted. 
45 See Chapters II and IV, passim. 
46
clark, 375-379, gives a complete description of this plot. 
l------------------------~ 
The plan was to hold Bismarck personally 
responsible for misleading the King into 
a warlike policy against Austria, 'which 
no true German desired, as it would simply 
play into the hands of France.' The King 
was to be urged to drop Bismarck and ap-
point a more liberal minister. In essence, 
it was simply the culmination of the struggle 
which had been going on for years at the 
Prussian Court, between the Crown Prince's 
faction and the Bismarck faction. 
'76 
All the people in Prussia who were friendly to Austria, either 
by kinship or merely because of their opposition to Bismarck 
47 
were employed to effect this plan. Even ~ueen Victoria wrote 
letters to the Dowager queen of Prussia supporting this mo~e. 
These influences which had been inaugurated in Vienna were 
assisted by the illness of Bismarck. This illness probably 
48 
was caused by his worries about the success of his plans. 
Mensdorff's plans seemed to be successful, and when Prussia 
accepted the proposal for mutual disarmament the designs for 
war seemed to have been forestalled. At this juncture, how-
ever, occurred the death-knell of Mensdorff's peace offensive 
49 
when the Emperor gave the order to mobilize against Italy. 
A favorable reply to Austria's offer of prior disarmament was 
being drafted in Berlin. Karolyi telegraphed this news to 
Mensdorff, but the telegram arrived a few hours after the 
47Letters of William and B~smarck dated April 3,4,7, and 8 
refer to this plot against Bismarck. These J.e tters indicate 
that Duke Ernest II of Coburg-Gotha was implicated. 
48Headlam-Morley, 249. 
49 The reasons for this will be found in Chapter IV. 
f 
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mobilization orders had been sent. 
77 
While Mensdorff pushed forward his peace campaign, Bis-
marck pushed forward his plans for reform in the Confederation. 
In spite of Pfordten's counter proposition, Bismarck hoped to 
win his support. On April 4, Savigny, the Prussian representa 
tive at Frankfort, received his preliminary instructions. On 
April 9, he presented the motion to the Diet. 
'The Diet will within a period to be pre-
cisely fixed decree the convocation of a 
National Assembly to be elected by universal 
and direct suffrage, for the purpose of re-
ceiving and deliberating on the proposals 
of the German Governments for the reform of 
the Confederation. The Governmen~ however, 
must meanwhile, and until the said Assembly 
comes together, determine on these proposals 
by mutual understanding.r51 
Needless to say, this motion was received with surprise and 
apprehension. Bismarck the reactionnary, had now turned to 
liberalism. As part of his absolutist program he had denied 
the rights of Augustenburg, and had denied the right of the 
people of Schleswig-Holstein to decide this matter. Austria, 
while more absolute than Prussia had defended Augustenburg 
and the duchies. "A popular assembly in Hanover declared it 
to be an accursed enterprise to use Confederate reform as a 
pretext for beginning a fraticidal war." Everywhere the 
at 6 
50 clark, 
P.M. 
51Malet, 
387. Telegram from Karolyi to Mensdorff arrived 
161-162, cites this motion. 
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r motion was received with condemnation:2 
~ 
Even foreign powers 
?8 
expressed their disapproval. But Bismarck remained undaunted. 
The question which had been raised by the motion April 91 was, 
on April 21, referred to a committee of nine members. At 
the same time it was decided to request the Prussian govern-
ment for details and explanations as to the object and extent 
of these reforms. The election of the committee took place on 
April 26. On April 27, Bismarck replied to the request. sayin 
'the determination of the period of the open-
ing of the Parliament was to be regarded as 
the essence of the proposition, and that he 
could put no reliance on the Governments 
coming to an agreement as to the text and 
terms of their proposals, unless that prelim-
inary determination was taken as a self-im-
posed necessity. 
'If this question was put aside, all 
serious consideration of Dietal reform became 
impossible; he would however indicate in the 
deliberations of the Committee, to what re-
gions of political life the Prussian propo-
sals would extend.'53 
Savigny was then called to Berlin to participate in the dis-
cussions of the proposals for confederate refor.m. 
Thus by April 27, 1866 Prussia had prepared the way for 
her proposed reforms of the Confederation. These reforms were 
connected with the Schleswig-Holstein question. Austria by 
April 21 had committed herself to war by the mobilization 
orders against Italy. 
52sybel, IV, 3?0-3?3. See also, Headlam-Morley, 253-254. 
53Malet, 162-163, cites Bismarck's reply of April 2?. 
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CHAPTER IV WAR COMES 
The events described in the last chapter indicated that 
war between Prussia and Austria was inevitable, but the moment 
that it was to be declared might be within a few weeks or 
months. Vf.h.en Austria mobilized against Italy, the first 
direct step had been taken. vVhy did the Emperor sign the 
mobilization order? Up to that time Austria's peace offen-
sive seemed to be successful but Mensdorff was the only one, 
who at this time, hoped for peace. His colleagues in the 
ministry were not favorable to his peace plans. While he was 
working for peace and trying to dissuade the Emperor from 
making further military preparations, word kept coming to Aus-
tria concerning the military preparations of Italy. Belcredi, 
the president of the ministry in Vienna, was anxious for war. 
Therefore, when a letter from the Director of Police in Venice 
informed Belcredi that the Italians were concentrating 49,000 
men at Bologna and that an Italian general was engaged in ob-
taining horses, he thought he could use this information to 
get action. It should be noted, however, that this action of 
the Italians was already known to the Intelligence service of 
1 
Austria. A Council was called on April 22, the day after the 
order for mobilization, but neither Mensdorff nor Esterhazy 
was present, both men being ill. Without these peace advocates 
the result was a foregone conclusion, namely, that further 
1 Clark, 381. 
r 
80. 
military preparations would be endorsed. The reason for this 
move was that Austria was afraid. Lord Bloomfield, the Englis 
Ambassador at Vienna said: "'The Austrians are driven wild by 
2 
the danger of their position.'" It was the consensus of opin-
ion in the European courts that Bismarck was responsible for 
the arming of Italy as a move to ruin the disarmament scheme 
3 
before it could be effected. It may be noted here that neithe 
government had taken any steps to disarm. 
The Austrian southern army was mobilized, and part of the 
northern army withdrawn from Bohemia. This was done in order 
to withstand a supposed attack by Garibaldi's men. This was 
only a rumor, but the harm had already been done. Secondly, 
"the threatened march of troops toward the Venetian frontier 
consisted of only twelve squadrons of cavalry which had been 
sent down to Naples against the brigands two years before; 
and as they proved unserviceable for this purpose, their re-
turn to their former garrisons had already been decided upon 
4 
some time previous to this." The English Ambassador at 
Florence, and the Russian ani French charges d'affaite~ all 
testified to their home governments that these moves by the 
26. 
2Ibid., 386, cites Bloomfield's note to Clarendon, April 
3Ibid., 38?. 
4sybel, IV, 393. 
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arm could not revoke her actions. Consequently, she had to 
arm further. Prussia warned Austria that she could not be in-
different to an attack on Italy. Prussia did not believe that 
the northern army of Austria would be reduced so she took step 
5 
to counteract this. By April 26, the Italian army was mobil-
6 
ized. 
Before we treat of the actual steps that led to mobiliza-
tion and war, we must return to Prussia's proposal for are-
form in the Confederation. After April 2?, Savigny had been 
recalled to Berlin to participate in the deliberations on the 
question of Federal reform. William wished only that Prussia 
would have rights and powers equal with those of Austria, and 
military supremacy at least over the northern states of the 
Confederacy. He also believed that a representative body e-
lected by the people should be established along with the Diet, 
but the Diet should maintain the controlling authority. It 
was also important for Prussia to keep these proposals modest 
? 
in order to prevent the possibility of foreign intervention. 
The result of these deliberations was the following communica-
tion to be presented to the committee appointed by the Diet. 
5Hozier, 35. 
6Mowat, 190. 
? Sybel, IV, 3??. 
'A national assembly shall be established, 
to be convened periodically, which shall 
share in Confederate legislation, and shall 
replace the requirement of unanimity which 
has hitherto been necessary in certain cases. 
The functions of this Confederate body thus 
organized shall be concerned with such mat-
ters of common interest as are designated 
in the Vienna Final Act; also with the re-
gulation of commercial intercourse, the free-
dom to move from State to State and hold a 
common citizenship, legislation respecting 
customs and trade, protection of German 
trade in foreign countries as well as of 
German navigation and German colors, a con-
sular representation of Germany as a whole, 
the establishment of a navy, revision of 
the Confederate military organization by 
providing for the better centralization of 
the forces with a view to increasing the 
actual efficiency of the whole army and 
lightening the burden of the individual. 
With reference to the system of election to 
be applied to the convention of the parlia-
ment ad hoc, universal suffrage shall pre-
vail,-one-Fepresentative being chosen for 
every one hundred thousand souls, and the 
eligibility of the candidate being dete~­
mined as in the electoral law of 1849.' 
These proposals were modest ones, but even then they were 
82 
likely to be refused by the Diet. Prussia announced that if 
this were the case then she would make even more strict de-
mands in the form of reforms. Thus, on May 11, Minister 
von Schrenck of Bavaria gave his report according to his 
instructions from the lesser states. He stated that before 
the Confederate assembly should take any steps that Prussia 
should be asked to present her outline for reform. But he 
8rbid., citation of proposal for reform. 
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also supplemented his report with a request that Savigny 
should be allowed to say a few words before the vote was taken 
The Prussian proposal was so moderate that the committee de-
cided to omit the vote until the representatives had received 
further instructions from their governments. This was done in 
spite of the opposition of Austria and Darmstadt. 
Austria viewed the complete Italian mobilization with 
some alarm. Consequently, Mensdorff sent two notes to Karolyi 
on April 26 which he was to present to the Prussian govern-
ment. The first dealt with Italy and mobilization; the second 
with Schleswig-Holstein. The first despatch said that the 
Emperor accepted the disarmament proposal (the acceptance of 
which by William had been received in Vienna on April 21, a 
few hours after the mobilization order against Italy had been 
signed). He was prepared to withdraw the troops from Bohemia, 
but it was necessary in order to protect the Venetian frontier 
to put her Italian or southern army on war footing. This 
mobilization was a cause of the second note. "When the army 
(Austrian] was once mobilized, the bad condition of the Aus-
trian finances forbade a long and inactive continuation of 
such an expensive state of things. Consequently, the source 
of the whole question, the Schleswig-Ho~tein question, must 
9 
be got out of the way as quickly as possible." Austria, 
therefore, according to her notes of March 16to the German 
9Ibid., 39?. See also, Malet, 16?-169. 
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states, offered Prussia snall gains in Schleswig-Holstein. 
At the same time she stated that if Prussia did not accept 
this proposal, Austria would refer the matter to the Diet and 
would also obtain the opinion of the Schleswig-Holstein Es-
tates. 
The Austrian government knew that this declaration might 
lead to hostilities, and on April 2?, the orders for mobiliza-
tion of the northern army were given. After the mobilization 
against Italy had been ordered, Mensdorff had undertaken to 
remove as much blame from Austria for this move as he possibly 
could. The move against Prussia, however, caused little loss 
of neutral support. Mensdorff had several plans in mind. 
First, he could seek the neutrality of Napoleon, and secondly, 
he could place the Schleswig-Holstein question before the 
10 
Diet at the proper time. 
Meanwhile in Berlin, Bismarck was taking no action. La 
Marmora requested information, but Bismarck would give none. 
He was waiting for the Austrian reply to his note of April 21 
stating that Prussia would accept the disarmament scheme. The 
reply was given to him on April 28, i.e., the two Austrian 
despatches of April 26. To the first despatch, Bismarck re-
plied on April 30; to the second, he did not reply until May?. 
1° Clark, 389. 
r I The n~e of April 30 declared: 
That they were grievously disappointed, 
having expected that the re-establishment 
of the normal status quo would have ex-
tended to all movements of troops conduc-
ing to the war effective state. The Im-
perial Government, however, now alluded 
merely to the movements of troops in Bo-
hemia, passing unnoticed those which had 
taken place in Moravia and West Galicia. 
Neither could the Prussian Government 
recognise the motives alleged for arming in 
Italy, for all sources of information agreed 
in stating that no warlike preparations had 
taken place in the kingdom of Italy •••• 
The Prussian Government could not but 
express the hope that Austria would not only 
withdraw all preparations in the northern 
provinces, but being speedily convinced of 
the groundlessness of any motives for arming 
in the south, would consequently proceed to 
restore the peace establishment of the entire 
Imperial army. On these conditions alone, or 
otherwise only by maintenance of parity in war 
effective of both states, could the Rolal Govern-
ment consent to enter on negotiationst 
85 
This despatch was delivered in Vienna on May 2, and replied to 
by Mensdorff on May 4. This latter despatch declared that 
negotiations with regard to di sar.mament ·had terminated. After 
the despatch of May 4, the Austrian army was strengthened by 
the calling in of the reserves and absentees in regiments not 
on war footing already. In Prussia orders for partial mobiliza 
12 
tion were given on May 3 and 5. The reply of Bismarck to the 
second Austrian despatch of April 26 was dated May?. Bismarek 
11Malet, 165-166. 
12sybel, IV, 405. 
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had delayed in answering this despatch because it obviously 
meant that the treaty of Gastein was abrogated. "Ror the de-
claration that Austria intended to bring the question before 
the Confederate Diet for settlement evidently could be ana-
wered only by the subordination of Prussia or a rupture that 
13 
vrould mean war." In his reply Bismarck stated that Prussia 
had every intention of abiding by the treaty of Vienna and the 
treaty of Gastein. Further, the intervention of any third 
party (this included the Diet) was precluded according to 
these two treaties. Prussia would not renounce her claims to 
the duchies to any third party, but was willing to negotiate 
with Austria concerning the terms on which the latter would. 
14 
cede her rights. Thus, the question of the duchies had come 
to an impasse, and no agreement was either possible or probable. 
Meanwhile. the secondary states were not idle. Upon the 
receipt of Bismarck's despatch many of them began to arm. The 
government of Saxony had received a supplementary note on 
April 27. In this note Prussia complained of the military 
preparations undertaken in Saxony which seemed to be directed 
against Prussia, and she asked for a satisfactory explanation. 
The Hanoverians armed because they knew that in the event of 
war their territory would only be a pawn. The King of Hanover 
13~., 402. 
14Malet, 169-170. 
r rejected Bismarck's gurantee of territorial integrity in re-
15 
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turn for neutrality. When Prussia started to mobilize at the 
beginning of May, Bavaria also began to arm. In the midst 
of all these preparations, an attempt was made on Bismarck's 
16 
life by Cohn, a Wurtemberg Republican. But this did not un-
nerve him. 
The situation in Germany at the beginning of May was as 
follows: 
The Austrian Government had not ceased its 
movement of troops, and, convinced at length 
of the seriousness of the crisis, began 
earnestly to prepare to meet it. The for-
tresses of Theresienstadt and JOsephstadt 
were armed, the fortifications of Cracow 
strengthened, and the restoration of the 
dilapidated place of arms, Koniggratz, was 
vigorously pressed. The regiments in Bohemia, 
Moravia, and West Galicia were raised to 
their full war.complement, several of them 
receiving their fourth battalion; the trans-
port corps was horsed, and the reserves 
formed. Two regiments of Hussars from 
Galicia, and three of Uhlans from Hungary, 
entered Bohemia and Moravia. The ammuni-
tion cars of the artillery were horsed. 
Concentration of troops took place at Pesth, 
Vienna, and Laybach, and the Grenzu or 
frontier battalions formed a reserve of 
forty battalions ready to take the field. 
All the men on furlough were summoned to 
the ranks, so that the Austrian force in 
readiness to take the field had apparently 
some advantage in priority of concentration. 
15yowat, 191. 
16sybel, IV, 406, says the man's name was Cohn. In a 
letter fromMarquis Wiepolski to Bismarck, May 8, the name is 
given as Blind. 
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The Prussian orders for mobilization 
were issued between the 3rd and 12th of :May. 
In the first instance they embraced only the 
3rd, 4th, 5th, and 6th army corps, and the 
guard, with a portion of the Landwehr of the 
5th and 6th district, to form battalions for 
garrison duty, but the entire cavalry and 
artillery were at once brought to their full 
war establishment, as was the case with the 1? 
light infantry (Jager) and pioneer battalions. 
While all these preparations were going on, Saxony on 
May 5 asked the Diet to demand a statement from Prussia with 
regard to her intentions concerning the peace of the Confeder-
ation. Savigny replied that Prussia was only protecting her 
frontiers as a means of defense. If the Confederation could 
not assure her (Prussia) of a satisfactory explanation of 
these moves then she must regard it {Confederation) as a 
source of danger and act to protect her own interest and inter 
national position. In spite of this explanation of the Prus-
sian envoy, the Saxon motion was carried ten votes to five on 
18 
:May 19. Feeling in Germany ran high and the lesser states con 
tinued to arm. On May 11 Wurtemberg followed Bavaria in is-
suing orders for general mobilization. Nevertheless, these 
19 
states were still interested in maintaining peace. On May 19 
1?Malet, 1?3. See also, pages 1?4-1?? where he gives a 
numerical summary of the relative strength of the Prussian, 
Austrian, and ~talian, and Confederate armies. "Prussia 
entered the war with 600,000 men, while Austria and her 
allies had some 360,000 men in Germany, and 150,000 in Italy. 
Italy had on foot nearly 300,00 combatants, ; • •• " 
18sybel, IV, 409, Malet, 1??; Rozier, 45, all give the 
same information. Rozier has the date wrong as May 9. 
19some references do not make it clear that the motion 
was presented on May 19, and accepted on May 24. 
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the following motion, which had been passed in the Conference 
of Bamberg attended by the representatives of Bavaria, wUr-
temberg, Baden, Grand-Ducal Hesse, Saxon Grand-Ducal, BrunsM 
wick, and Nassau, was made in the Diet: 
'The Diet will request those members of the 
Confederation which have taken any steps 
for military preparation or movements be-
yond their peace establishments, to declare 
in the next sitting of the Diet, whether, 
and on what conditions, they will be pre-
pared simultaneously to reduce their armed 
force to the peace establishment, and on a 
day to be agreed upon in the Diet's sitting.•20 
On May 24 the Diet unanimously accepted this motion, and the 
vote was to be taken on ~une 1. 
In the midst of these preparations, Napoleon proposed 
that the difficulties be settled by a congress. On April 25 
Napoleon had remarked to Goltz that perhaps a congress would 
be able to eliminate the confusion and restore peace. But 
the chief difficulty was the possibility of compensation for 
France. However, on May 2, Benedetti officially asked Bis-
marck how he would receive the invitation to a congress. 
Bismarck said that such a congress would be agreeable if 
Prussia and France had some secret understanding beforehand. 
At first the possibility of such an understanding seemed im-
probable because Prussia was regarded with disfavor by the 
French. Secondly, Austria had offered to cede Venetia to 
20Malet, 1?8, cites the motion. 
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to Italy in return for Silesia. On May 5, Napoleon communi-
cated this information to the Italian government, but the 
Italins did not favor an alliance with France against Prussia. 
They were beginning to feel enthusiastic about the Prussian 
21 
alliance and a dislike for any dealings with France. After 
this rebuff Napoleon told Goltz that his only hope was that 
the congress would prevent war. consequently plans were made. 
England, Russia, and France were to be represented, and in-
vitations were extended to Austria, Prussia, Italy, and the 
Diet on May 24. 
Prussia accepted on May 29, Italy and the Diet on June 1. 
Austria who had been engaged in secret negotiations with 
22 
France since the end of April, had determined not to permit 
the question of Venetia to come before a conference. The 
subjects of discussion for which the conference had been sum-
moned were: the question of the two duchies; the means of 
pacifying Italy; and the reform of the Diet in so far as it 
23 
affected the balance of power in Europe. Austria accepted 
the invitation but on two conditions, namely, that an invita-
tion should be extended to the Pope {but this had already 
been refused by France, England, and Russia), and secondly• 
that no subject which involved territorial aggrandizement 
2lsybel, IV, 414-425, has the best account of the re-
lations between France and Italy. 
22see pages 94-95. 
23Malet, 193. 
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t should be discussed. This condition was a virtual refusal. 
In his answer, dated June 1, Mensdorff said that the invita-
tion implied the cession of Venetia, but that Austria could 
not countenance this. But, "'If war should actually break 
out, if brilliant military successes should raise the power of 
Austria, then, indeed, it would not be out of the question 
for us to give up one province in order to insure another.•• 
This meant that in the event of war, Austria would give up 
24 
Venetia in order to conquer Prussia and regain Silesia. It 
might be added that the Diet had an objection to the proposed 
program, namely, that the question of Holstein, leaving out 
the question of Schleswig, was a question which came under 
the jurisdiction of the Diet, and this body retained ita 
25 
right to decline foreign intervention. But in view of Aus-
tria's reply, the answer of the Diet was not considered. 
Austria probably made a mistake in handling the question 
26 
of the conference. Even if she had no desire to attend, it 
would have been better if she had delayed any definite state-
ment. Thus, Napoleon's plans for peace had failed, but there 
were another peace negotiations in progress. These are known 
as the Gablenz negotiations. 
Baron Anton Gablenz was the brother of the Austrian 
Statthalter of Holstein and a resident of Prussia. He was re-
24sybel, IV, 460-461. 
25Malet, 194. 
26clark, 428-429. 
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garded with high esteem in governmental circles. He wished to 
find a satisfactory solution to the question of the duchies in 
order to avoid war. Gablenz appeared in Vienna in April, but 
Mensdorff, although he received him in a friendly manner, told 
him to present his plan in Prussia. Mensdorff then gave him a 
letter of introduction to Bismarck, and he appeared in Berlin 
27 
at the beginning of May. His plan was as follows: 
Austria had desired an independent, Prussia a 
Prussian Schleswig-Holstein: therefore Gab-
lenz proposed to place the sovereignty of the 
Duchies as an independent state in the hands 
of a Prussian prince. For an independent 
Schleswig-Holstein Prussia had imposed the 
'February conditionsJ and Austria rejected 
these as inconsistent with the Confederate 
military organization: Gablenz now proposed 
a new reform of this organization, equally 
to Prussia's and to Austria's advantage, by 
suggesting that in war and in peace Austria 
should have the superior command over the 
South German, and Prussia over the North 
German, troops. 
Then he included other details with regard to Kiel, to for-
tresses and to garrisons. Austria was to receive three mil-
lion thalers from Prussia for Kiel, and twenty million from 
the duchies for war expenses. 
Bismarck was surprised by this attempt at reconciliation, 
especially in view of the war fever in Vienna. He decided 
to determine, if possible, the extent of the sincerity of 
Austria. On May 4, therefore, he informed Werther that Gab-
27 sybel, IV, 414-42, has the best account of these ne-
gotiations. Clark, 414-428, also has a good account, but 
gives Sybel credit for the best account. 
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lenz would arrive in Vienna on May 5. Bismarck replied on 
28 
May 7 to Mensdorff's second despatch of April 26. Gablenz 
arrived in Vienna and Mensdorff promised to inform the Em-
93 
peror. Both Mensdorff and Esterhazy were willing to do almost 
anything to maintain peace, but others in the ministry were 
not so disposed. Franz joseph consented to a continuation of 
the Gablenz negotiations, but asked that a more definite plan 
be formed. Gablenz returned, therefore, to Berlin on Yay lOt 
and remained there until May 20. During this time Gablena 
and Bismarck deliberated over the more detailed plans. Finall 
29 
the revision was agreed upon. William approved this, and in a 
special audience with Gablenz asked him to communicate these 
proposals directly to Franz joseph. Before Gablenz departed 
again for Vienna, Manteuffel had written a letter, dated 
May 18, to William. In this letter he described a conversatio 
with General von Gablenz, the Austrian Statthalter• and Man-
teuffel urged a quick and definite decision. Manteuffel• in 
William's reply, was urged to communicate to Gablenz William's 
desire for peace. These same sentiments were sent to Werther, 
that is, no official action was to begin until Prussia was 
sure of Austria's sincerity. Until that time, Gablenz was to 
convey William's desire for peace to the Emperor. 
2Bsee pages 85-86. 
29see Appendix F. 
r 
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Gablenz arrived again in Vienna on May 22, having been 
delayed by military transports. An interview with Franz Jo-
seph took place. During the interview, Gablenz urged the ap-
pointment of General Gablenz as a commissioner to act with 
Manteuffel who would be appointed by Prussia. These two might 
be able to lessen the distrust which existed between the two 
powers. The Emperor said that these proposals came six weeks 
too late. For some reason the Emperor insisted that Bismarck 
was the author of these proposals, and nothing that Gablenz 
could say would dissuade the Emperor. He gave him no definite 
reply, but was very cordial. These negotiations actually 
ended at this point. They were undoubtedly the best solution 
of the question, but the preparations for war had progressed 
to such an extent that it was impossible to retreat. Secondly 
Austria felt obligated to the lesser states. If she had ac-
cepted these proposals, it would have meant that she would havE 
had to desert them to return to her Prussian alliance. On 
May 28, Mensdorff wrote the official Austrian reply to the 
effect that in view of the strained relations, no further ne-
gotiations were permissible. 
Austria still continued her efforts to obtain alliances. 
On June 1, she had replied to Napoleon's invitation to the 
conference with conditions. When these conditions were made 
known, it became evident on what grounds Austria would seek 
an agreement with France. During April, Austria had appro ache 
95 
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France, but these approaches were not successful. In view of 
Austria's answer to the invitation to the congress, Napoleon 
announced on June 3 that the plan had been abandoned. On 
June 4, the Emperor, Drouyn de Lhuys, and the Due de Gramont 
conferred on the instructions with which Gramont would return 
to Vienna. Between June 4 and June 9, there were many deliber 
ations, but a treaty was finally concluded on June 12. The 
first draft of the treaty "offered French neutrality on two 
conditions, the cession of Venetia after the war under ~ 
circumstances, and the promise not to make territorial changes 
without French consent, if the balance of power in Germany 
31 
were threatened." These conditions were not enthusiastically 
received in Vienna, but Gramont was able to make further con-
cessions which were detrimental to Italian unity. As Sybel 
says: "France gave up Italian unity to the Court of Vienna, 
in return for which Austria sacrificed German independence to 
the French." A Council was held in Vienna on June 11, and it 
was decided to accept the treaty as better than nothing, but 
neither the Emperor nor the ministers was pleased. Mensdorff 
and Gramont signed the treaty on June 12. All it did was to 
give Austria a feeling of security, but there were no real 
benefits. 
Let us return to the proceedings which led directly to the 
30clark, 40?, 411-413. 
31 rbid., 434. 
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declarations of war. On May 24, the Diet had accepted the 
motion prepared in the Bamberg Convention, and the vote was to 
be taken at the next session on June 1. When the Diet met 
Baron Kubeck presented Austria's answer. 
Accordingly, Austria now declared that she 
had been forced to arm on account of Prussia's 
claims to Schleswig-Holstein, unlawful in 
themselves and supported by an alliance with 
Italy and by threats of force: Austria would 
disarm when a lawful and constitutional state 
of things was re-established in the Duchies; 
therefore, she was about to refer the ques-
tion of the Duchies to the decision of the 
German Confederation, which should before-
hand be assured of Austria's heartiest recog-
nition, and she would at the same time an-
nounce that the Statthalter of Holstein had 
received orders to summon the Estates of the 
country, whose wishes and judgment in point 
of law should form an important factor in the 
final decision~3 · 
This was virtually a declaration of war because it was well 
known that the Diet would support Austria, and that Prussia 
would retaliate with an attempt to overthrow the Confederation 
To these remarks Baron de Savigny, the Prussian envoy replied. 
He 
commenced his remarks by a repetition of 
the charge against Austria of having taken 
the lead in arming. He said, however that 
the Prussian government was still ready to 
revert to the peace establisment, if the 
Diet would enjoin Austria and Saxony to 
countermand their preparations which were 
menaning to peace, and if the Royal Govern-
32John Ward, Experiences of a Diplomatist. London: 
!mcmillan and Company, 18?2, 239. 
33sybel, IV, 461. 
ment could be guaranteed against similar 
infractions of the Federal peace. If the 
Diet found itself incompetent to the task, 
or if it opposed the introduction of such a 
reform as was calculated to obviate the re-
currence of such situations, Prussia would 
found her future decisions solely on her own 
appreciation of rights. 
In the proceedings of Austria, both as 
regarded her appeal to the Diet, and in con-
voking the States of Holstein, Prussia saw a 
violation of the Convention of Gastein~4 
9? 
On June 3, Bismarck addressed a protest containing these 
ideas to Vienna. He concluded that since the treaty of Gas-
tein had been violated, the condominate power was reestablishe 
in the duchies, and Manteuffel had been placed in command of 
the defense of the condominate rights. This'was followed on 
June 4 by a formal circular to the German states and the other 
European states in which he accused Austria of an attempt to 
bring on war, and further said that Prussia had tried to pre-
serve peace. Bismarck published on June 5, the heretofore 
35 
secret tresu of January 16, 1864. By this he hoped to ali-
enate the rest of Ger.many from Austria by showing that she had 
no regard for the Confederation. He seemed not to care that 
36 
this proved the same disregard by Prussia. 
\Vhile these and other diplomatic notes were exch~nged, 
military preparations were pushed forward. On June 5, General 
Gablenz issued the order convoking the Holstein Estates. 
34 Malet, 1?9-180. 
35 see page 12. 
36Mowat, 191. 
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Manteuffel protested. The Austrian troops at Rendsburg left 
on June 7, and on June 8 and 9 Manteuffel crossed the Eider. 
The Austrian government was declared terminated, and Baron 
von Scheel Plessen became Over-President of the two duchies. 
At Izehoe, on June 10, the Holstein Estates began to assemble. 
But when the representatives learned of the new turn of affair 
they left. On June 11, Gablenz moved his entire force from 
Altona across the Elbe to Harburg during the night. This was 
done to avoid collision with the Prussian forces which were 
advancing from the north. 
Prussia, on June 9, entered a protest against the inter-
vention of the Diet in the affairs of Holstein. She reiterate 
her plans for reform, and would accept a satisfactory solution 
of the question of reform. On June 9, Mensdorff replied to 
Bismarck's note of June 3. 
'That the rights of the Germanic Con-
federation neither ought to be nor could be 
infringed by any agreement made between 
Austria and Prussia; neither could any mem-
ber of the Confederation, which declared 
its willingness to recognise the consti-
tutional decision of the Diet, trench there-
by on the right of any other Confederate. 
'The Royal Prussian Government, having 
by word and deed ignored the binding force of 
its engagements to Austria, had lost the right 
of appealing, as against Austria, to obliga-
tions which she herself had not respected. 
'That the Imperial Government protested 
against the taking matters into her own hands 
(Selbsthulfe), whereby Prussia had violated 
Article XI of the constitutional Act, and 
had brought on the case provided for by 
Article XIX of the final Act of Vienna.t3? 
99 
On june 10, Bigmarck sent the Prussian plan for the re-
38 
form of the Confederation to all the German governments. 
Austria proposed in an extraordin2~y sitting of the Diet on 
june 11 that all Federal contingents should be mobilized and 
39 
be prepared to move within twenty-four hours. By a vote of 
nine to six, the Austrian proposal was carried at the meeting 
40 
on june 14. Karolyi had been recalled from Berlin on june 12 
and passports had been sent to Werther. In this fashion 
Austria broke off diplomatic relations. Immediately after 
Austria's motion had been passed, Savigny rose and, according 
41 
to his instructions from Bismarck, he outlined the Prussian 
plan for reform. At the same time he declared that the old 
Confederation was dissolved because a break of the union had 
3?For Article XI, see Appendix H. Article XIX of the 
Vienna Final Act is as follows: "'Should there be ground for 
apprehending the use of force between Confederates, or should 
such have taken place, the Diet has the duty of taking pre-
liminary steps for staying all self-righting • • • , and for 
putting a stop thereto if begun. For this object, care is 
above all to be given to the maintenance of the existing 
right of possession.'" Malet, 18?. 
38see Appendix G. 
39Malet, 188, in footnote. See also Sybel, IV, 493-496. 
40Ma1et, 189. 
41sybel, IV, 496-49?. 
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been constituted by the waging of war by the Diet on one mem-
ber. He concluded by asking the states who had remained to 
form a new Confederation. Baron Kubek, the President, re-
primanded him for this motion and the majority of the Diet 
concurred in the reprimand. 
Meanwhile, in Prussia Bismarck had been preparing for 
war. On June 15, Hesse-Cassel, Hanover, and Saxony received 
notes from Prussia. These notes requested these governments 
to declare in favor of Prussia. If the reply was negative, 
Prussia would declare war upon the three states. Samny 
refused immediately. The other two states did not answer 
within the prescribed time, and was was declared upon them, 
also. The actual war began on June 16. The Austrian declara-
42 
tion followed on June 17, and the Italian on June 20. 
42Mowat, 191. 
CHAPTER V WAR AND PEACE 
When war was declared between Austria and Prussia, neithe 
power stood alone. Austria was supported by the South German 
states, namely, Bavaria, Wurtemberg, Baden and Hesse-Dar.m-
stadt, and by the more important North German States, namely, 
Hanover, Saxony, Hesse-Cassel, and Nassau. Prussia in view 
of her treaty with Italy was supported by Italy. While the 
majority of the members of the Confederation supported Austria, 
the international situation was favorable to Prussia. Great 
Britain's favor had been secured by low tariff relations be-
tween her and the zollverein; Russia's, through Prussian in-
tervention in the Polish insurrection in 1863; France, because 
Bismarck knew how to appeal to the political ambitions of Na-
1 
poleon. In general, the attitude of the German states was 
very hostile. Most of them were willing to endure any sacri-
fices in order to crush Prussia. Hanover was the outstanding 
example. B.Y her adhesion to Austria, Hanover lost her nation-
al existence. Saxony would have suffered the same fate had it 
not been for the interference of Napoleon and the obstinance 
2 
of Austria during the peace negotiations. 
The war was a short one, lasting only seven weeks. To 
the surprise of Europe, Prussian arms overcame Austria in a 
lHayes, 188-189. 
2 Malet, 202-205. 
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3 
short time. At the outset of the struggle the opinion of 
Europe favored Austria as the victor. This was because most 
of the powers underrated Prussia's military strength. Within 
two weeks Prussia had subdued the lesser German states. The 
most important battle in these engagements against the minor 
German states was the battle of Langensalza in which the 
Hanoverians were badly defeated by the Prussians. A week 
earlier, on June 27, the Bavarians had been routed at Fulda. 
While Prussia was subduing the lesser states, Austrian ar.ms 
had been successful in Italy. This had been accomplished 
by the addition of part of the Austrian northern army. Un-
fortunately, this lowered the defenses of Bohemia and en-
nabled the Prussian troops to enter Bohemia. Here on June 3, 
at Koniggratz or Sadowa, the most important and decisive bat-
tle of the war was fought. Prussia was victorious. Feldzug-
meister Benedek, although an able and devoted soldier, could 
not compare with the Prussian strategist, Moltke. When Franz 
Joseph heard that the Bohemian army was in retreat he tried to 
cede Venetia to Napoleon. In this way he hoped to involve 
France against Italy. Advances for peace were made to Italy, 
4 
but she refused to conclude terms of peace until Prussia did. 
When the Prussians won at Koniggratz the war had been decided. 
3For a complete description of the war itself, see 
Hozier. This thesis does not include any details as to mili-
tary engagements. 
4Munster, 101. 
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On July 4, Franz Joseph telegraphed Napoleon, requesting 
his good offices in the peace negotiations. It was in this 
telegram that the Emperor agreed to cede Venetia. Immediately 
Napoleon telegraphed William of these events, and offered his 
services as mediator. Bismarck decided that Prussia could not 
afford to refuse Napoleon's offer because West Germany was al-
most defenseless and the southern German states had not been 
conquered. If he refused, it was possible that Napoleon might 
enter the war. Consequently, he replied that Prussia was 
willing to accept an armistice, "but it was only on condition 
that the preliminaries of peace were settled before hostilitie 
ceased, and to them the King could not agree except after con-
5 
sultation with the King of Italy." Meanwhile the Prussian army 
advanced towards Vienna. 
Bismarck was proceeding slowly because he did not wish to 
have the terms of peace dictated by a congress of ~ropean 
6 
powers. England, he was sure, would not interfere. Of France 
and Russia, he could not be so sure. Napoleon changed from 
day to day as to what the preli~inary peace should include. 
Finally, on July 14, Goltz was able to send Bismarck some 
definite information. Benedetti arrived in Berlin to discuss 
the terms of peace with Bismarck, but he had no definite in-
5Headlam-Morley, 263. 
6cambridge History ~British Foreign Policy, II, 580. 
With the death of Palmerston, British foreign policy changed, 
and England no longer aimed at being the arbiter of Europe. 
104 
structions. All that Benedetti had been instructed to do was 
to urge Prussia to moderation. Bismarck asked what non-German 
compensation Napoleon desired, but Benedetti remained silent. 
The truth of this matter seems to be that Napoleon did not 
know what he wanted. These negotiations were of little value 
to the finalpeace negotiations, and ultimately all that Napol-
eon asked was that Prussia should be moderate; that the unity 
of Germany should be avoided, if only in appearance; and that 
7 
Saxony should be spared. 
MearoNhile, Bismarck had decided to enter into separate 
negotiations with Austria as to the terms of the preliminary 
peace. This was done indirectly, at first, through diplomatic 
channels through st. Petersburg. An Austrian nobleman who was 
friendly to Prussia also undertook a mission of peace. He 
announced to the Emperor the terms on which Prussia would make 
peace. These ter.ms were very lenient, but had been made so 
8 
only after a struggle in Berlin in the Council. In substance 
these terms provided for the dissolution of the old Confedera-
tion and the establishment of a new North German Confederation 
secondly, Austria agreed that the southern states might for.m 
their own uniona thirdly, she renounced her rights to the 
duchies and acquiesced in certain additions to Prussian ter-
ritoryJ and fourth, she ceded Venetia to Italy. These pre-
liminaries were signed at Nicolsburg on July 26. 
7Headlam-Morley, 270-273. 
Bsee pages 105-+06 
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The last thing that remained was to secure the assent of 
William. On July 12, a council of War had been held at Prue-
sian headquarters at Czermahoen. The Generals and even the 
King were enthralled with their first great victory over a 
first-class power. Moltke was busy with plans to capture Vi-
enna, but Bismarck would not agree. He realized that after 
the war Prussia would need a friend. If the terms of peace 
were lenient, then the feeling in Austria would not be so hos-
tile and proud Austria would not feel that she had been humil-
iated. Bismarck says in his Reminiscences: "It was my object 
in view of our subsequent relations with Austria, as far as 
possible to avoid cause for mortifying reminiscences, if it 
could be managed without prejudice to our German policy." 
With regard to a triumphal entry into Vienna he says: 
A triumphal entry of the Prussian army into 
the hostile capital would naturally have 
been gratifying recollection for our sol-
diers, but it was not necessary for our 
policy. It would have left behind it, as 
also any surrender of ancient possessions 
to us must have done, a wound to the pride 
of Austria, which, without being a pressing 
necessity for us, would have unnecessarily 
increased the difficulty of our future 
mutual relations. It was already quite 
clear to me that we would have to defend the 
conquests of our campaign in future wars, 
•••• That a war with France would succeed 
that wi~h Austria lay in the logic of history, 
• • • • 
However, two weeks passed before anything definite had to be 
9otto Bismarck, Bismarck, the Man and the Statesman. 
New York: Harper and Brothers,ll89~c:-dl-;-42. 
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decided since it was necessary to replenish the artillery if 
the Prussians were to advance to Vienna. 
On July 23, another Council was held. Bismarck was only 
more firm in his opinion that the war should be concluded with 
out any further humiliation of Austria. But he was alone in 
his opinion. He presented all his evidence including document 
but still the opinion was against him. Finally, he rose and 
left the romm, and went to his own room. While he was there 
musing on the probable failure of all his plans, the Crown 
Prince entered. He said: "You know that I was against this 
war. You considered it necessary and the responsibility for 
it li:es on you. If you are now persuaded that our end is at• 
tained, and peace must be concluded, I am ready to support 
you, and defend your opinion with my father." The Prince 
then went to his father, and within half an hour he returned. 
11 It has been a difficult business, but my father has consented 
The King could not stand against both his son and Bismarck• 
but that he did as he did unwillingly can be testified to by 
the following marginal notes. 
'Inaamuch as my Minister-President has left 
me in the lurch in the face of the enemy, and 
here I am not in a position to supply his 
place, I have discussed the question with my 
son; and as he has associated himself with 
the Minister-President's opinion, I feel 
myself reluctantly compelled, after such 
brilliant victories on the part of the army, 
to bite this sour apple and accept so dis-
graceful a peace. tlD 
lOBismarck, 48-54. This is his own account. 
Thus, after almost despairing Bismarck had won his greatest 
victory, and the preliminaries of peace were signed. 
10? 
Before the final treaty of peace was signed, Napoleon 
through Drouyn de Lhuys made one more attempt to influence the 
11 
peace settlement, but it was unsuccessful. However, Bismarck 
12 
was able to use this attempt later in his war against France. 
The final peace was signed on August 23, 1866 at Prague by 
Werther for Prussia and Brenner for Austria. Venetia was 
ceded to Italy; Franz Joseph acknowledged the dissolution of 
the Confederation and the creation of a new North German Con-
federation to be composed of the states north of the Main. 
North of the Main Prussia could annex such territory as she 
wished, but promised to spare Saxony. The South German states 
could organize their own union if they wished, but Austria 
was forever excluded from Germany. Austria's rights in the 
duchies were ceded to Prussia subject to a proposed plebiscite 
1 
with regard to the wishes of the population of North Schleswig 
Prussian territory was increased by 28,000 Eng]sh square miles, 
14 
and the population was increased by 3t million inhabitants. 
Peace between Italy and Austria was concluded on October 3, 
1866 at Vienna. 
11Malet, 373. 
12 Headlam-Morley, 278. 
13subsequently abrogated by a treaty of October 11, 18?8. 
14Mowat, 195. 
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Thus, Prussian supremacy was established in North Ger-
many. But what was the influence of the question of the duch-
ies in the development of the unification of Germany? Bis-
marck had realized that in order to bring about Prussian 
hegemony in Germany and its unification, that Austria would 
15 
have to be expelled from the Confederation. It was then 
necessary for him to have at hand a means whereby he could 
force a war with Austria, and through this war defeat her, 
and his plans for a new Confederation could be enforced. The 
Schleswig-Holstein question furnished the necessary pretext 
for embroiling Austria in war. Previous to 1865, the question 
had been an international one, but after that time it became 
16 
an element in the relations between Austria and Prussia. 
During the course of the negotiations and diplomatic relations 
between the two powers, both of them had introduced the ques-
tion of Federal reform. This was probably done to enlist the 
assistance of the other German states in the event of war. 
Bismarck was proud of the diplomacy employed in the 
Schleswig-Holstein affair. He said: "'What I am proudest of, 
however, is our success in the Schleswig-Holstein affair, in 
which the diplomatic intrigues would furnish matter for a 
17 
play.'" By using the divergent laws of succession of the 
Danish monarchy and the duchies, and the disagreement between 
15Malet, 112. 
16cambridge History£! British Foreign Policy, II, 581. 
17Moritz Busch, Bismarck: Some 
History. London: Macmillan Com-a--
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the two with regard to the type of union, Bismarck had caused 
the war of 1864. BY entangling Austria with Prussia in the ad 
ministration of the duchies, Bismarck caused the war of 1866 
and the consequent exclusion of Austria from the confederation 
In this way the hegemony of Prussia was established in North 
Germany. Complete unification under Prussian leadership could 
not be established until a war with France united the South 
German states to the Northern confederation. In concluding, 
it is necessary to say a word about the reform of the Confed-
eration. Some have said that the reform was the cause of the 
18 
war between the two po7:ers. Whether or not this is true does 
not come within the scope of this .. thesis. All that has been 
attempted has been to show that the question of the duchies of 
Schleswig and Holstein was instrumental in causing a war with 
Austria. And secondly, that it was in virtue of this war that 
Austria was expelled from Germany, and Prussian leadership 
assured. By the zollverein Bismarck had established Prussian 
economic superiority, by the war with Austria he had excluded 
extraneous nationalities from participation in German affairs 
and had secured Prussian superiority among the German states. 
But it still remained for a war with France to complete the 
political unification of Germany. 
lSMowat, 190. 
History ~ Germany. 
II, 396-397. 
See also, Ernest Flagg Henderson, A Short 
New York: The Macmillan Company,-1916, · 
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APPENDIX A 
BLOME'S PROPOSAL 
The exercise of those rights that have been obtained by 
the two Powers in virtue of the Peace of Vienna shall in 
Holstein be the affair of Austria, and in Schleswig, of Prus-
sia. Prussia s·hall for this purpose be granted a military 
road with stations and also a line of telegraph through Hal-
stein; and she shall furthermore receive permission to build 
a canal connecting the North Sea and the Ba~ ic on conditions 
similar to those usually granted in the charter of a railway 
(consequently, without the right of supreme domain or the 
right to build fortifications). The Confederation shall be 
requested to raise Kiel to the rank of a Confederate port, 
and Rendsburg to that of a Confederate fortress. Until the 
necessary Confederate decree is passed concerning this matter, 
the garrison at Rendsburg shall be composed of Austrian and 
Prussian troops, and the harbor of Kiel shall be used by the 
men-of-war of both Powers. The intention is, that both of 
the Duchies shall join the Tariff Union. Finally Austria 
shall give up to Prussia her rights in Lauenburg in return for 
a proper indemnity in money. 
From a Prussian State Document 
cited by Sybel, IV, 210. 
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APPENDIX B 
TEXT OF THE TREATY OF GASTEIN 
Art. 1--The common right obtained by the high contracting 
parties by Art. 3 of the Treaty of Vienna of the 30th of Octo-
ber, 1864, is transferred, as respects the Duchy of Holstein, 
to his Majesty the Emperor of Austria, and as respects the 
Duchy of Schleswig, to his Majesty the King of Prussia, with-
out prejudice to the continuation of these rights of both 
Powers to the whole of both Duchies. 
Art. 2--The high contracting parties will propose in the 
Diet the establisl~ent of a German fleet, and appoint the 
port of Kiel as the Federal harbour. Until the putting in 
execution of the consequent Dietal decree, this port to be 
made use of by the ships of war of both Powers, the commander-
ship and police of the port to be exercised by Prussia. At 
Friederichsort, opposite the entrance, Prussia is authorised 
to erect the necessary defensive works, as well as to construe 
such marine establishments on the Holstein shore as are re-
quisite for a port of war. These fortifications and estab-
lishments are to be likewise under Prussian command, and the 
Prussian marines and sailors re~uired for garrisoning and 
protection thereof may be quartered in Kiel and the vicinity. 
Art. 3--The high contracting parties will propose at 
Frankfort to establish Rendsburg as a Federal fortress. Un-
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til the Diet has regulated the mode of garrisoning this for-
tress, the garrison is to be composed of Imperial Austrian and 
Royal Prussian troops, with the com.rnand alternating yearly, 
on the 1st of July. 
Art. 4--Until the carrying out of the partition stipulated 
by Art. 1 of this Convention, the Prussian Government shall 
have possession of two military roads through Holstein; the 
one from Lubeck to Kiel, the other from Hamburg to Rendsburg. 
Special regulations as to the places of halt are to be made 
as soon as possible by a sep&.rate convention, as well as for 
the transporting and the providing for the troops: until this 
is done the existing regulations for the Prussian march-routes 
through Hanover to be in force. 
Art. 5--The Prussian Goverrunent has the privilege of us-
ing a telegraphic wire for ~ mmunicating between Kiel and 
Rendsburg, and the right for its Post-office carriages, with 
its own employes, to circuL~·.te on both railway lines through-
out the Duchy of Holstein. 
Inasmuch as the construction of a direct railroad from 
LUbeck to Kiel across the boundary of Schleswig is not yet 
assured, the concession for the same shall be granted on the 
usual conditions if requisition is made by Prussia--so far 
reg~rds Holstein territory--without any demand of sovereign 
rights, as respects the railroad, on the part of Prussia. 
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Art. 6--The high contracting parties hold the common in-
tent, that the Duchies shall accede to the German customs 
union. Each Duchy, until further arrangement, maintains the 
system of customs hitherto subsisting, with equal partition 
of revenue, until union with the Zollverein. In case it seems 
expedient to the Royal Prussian Government to open negotiationf 
for the accession of the Duchies to the Zollverein, pending 
the duration of the separation which has been agreed upon by 
Art. 1 of the present Treaty, his Majesty the Emperor of Aus-
tria is ready to name a plenipotentiary to ta~e part in such 
negotiation. 
Art. ?--Prussia has the right of directing through Hol-
stein territory the intended North Sea canal, which is to be 
built after the plans of the technical surveys instituted by 
the Royal Government; that is to say, Prussia has the right 
of prescribing the direction and the dimensions of the Canal, 
to acquire--by way of expropriation and for paY-ment of its 
value--the land required for the construction, to direct the 
building, to have the supervision and maintenance of the Canal 
and to exercise the faculty of enacting all regulatory ordon-
nances. 
No transit duties or imposts on vessel or cargo, beyond 
those similar normal ship-tolls for use of the Canal which 
Prussia will establish for the vessels of all nations, are 
to ·be exacted upon the whole extent of the Canal. 
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Art. 8--This Convention makes no change in the stipulatior.s 
of the Vienna Treaty of 30th of October, 1864, as to the fi-
nancial services to be respectively at the charge of the Duch-
ies, of Denmark, and of Austria and Prussia; but the Duchy of 
La.uenburg shall be freed from all contribution to war costs. 
The repartition of these costs between the Duchies of Holstein 
and Schleswig shall be made in proportion to the population. 
Art. 9--His Majesty the ::rr:mperor of Austria gives over 
to his Majesty the King of Prussia the rights accruing to him, 
by the oft-cited Treaty of Vienna, to the :Duchy of Lauenburg, 
in exchange for which cession the Royal Prussian Government 
binds itself to pay the Imperial Austrian Government the sum 
of two millions five hundred thousand Danish rixthalers, pay-
able in Berlin in Prussian specie, within four weeks after 
ratification of the present Treaty by their Majesties the 
Emperor of Austria and the King of Prussia. 
Art. 10--The execution of the hereinbefore-agreed-upon 
partition of the joint sovereignty shall follows as speedily 
as possible upon the ratification of this Convention by their 
Majesties the Emperor of Austria and the King of Prussia, and 
at latest be carried out by the 15th of September, after 
termination of the evacuation of Schleswig by the Austrian 
and of Holstein by the Prussian troops. 
Signed at Gastein, the 14th of August, 1865, 
(Signed) G. Blome, M.P. 
(Signed) V. Bismarck, M.P. 
Text cited from Malet, 106-110. 
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APPEliDIX C 
TEXT OF THE TREATY WITH ITALY 
Art. I. Friendship and alliance are to be maintained be-
tween His Majesty the King of Prussia, and His Majesty the 
King of Italy. 
Art. II. If the negotiations His Majesty the King of 
Prussia has opened with the other German Government concerning 
certain reforms of the Confederate Constitution, which are 
demanded by the needs of the German Nation, shall fail, and 
in consequence thereof His Majesty be forced to take up arms 
in order to give effect to his proposals, then His Majesty 
the King of Italy, after Prussia has taken the initiative, 
and so soon as he is made aware of that fact, shall in virtue 
of this Treaty, immediately declare war against Austria. 
Art. III. From that moment the war shall be carried on 
by both their Majesties with all the powers that Providence 
has placed at theil' disposal; and neither Italy nor Prussia 
shall conclude either peace or armistice without consent of 
the other. 
Art. IV. This consent may not be withheld, when Austria 
shall have expressed her willingness to cede to Italy the 
Lombardo-Venetian kingdom and to Prussia Austrian territory 
that shall be equivalent in population to the above-mentioned 
kingdom. 
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Art. V. This treaty loses its validity three months 
after being signed, unless the conditions mentioned in 
Article II. shall have been fulfilled, namely, that Prussia 
shall have declared war upon Austria. 
Art. VI. If the Austrian fleet, which is now being 
equipped, shall have quitted the Adriatic Sea before the de-
claration of war, then shall His Majesty the King of Italy 
send a sufficient number of ships to the Baltic Sea, which 
shall take up their station there in order to be ready to 
unite with the Prussian fleet at the outbreak of hostilities. 
From a Prussian State Document, 
cited by Sybel, IV, 355. 
APPENDIX D 
PROCLAMATION OF GABLENZ 
118 
Keeping aloof from political complications, I am solely 
inspired by the wish sedulously to promote the development 
of the country's weal; a stranger to all party, and desirous 
of anticipating the just wishes of the people, supported by 
their confidence. 
Cited by Malet, 115. 
PROCLML~TION OF ]L~EUFFEL 
B,y the Treaty of Gastein, you are transferred to a 
separate Government, under the authority of the King of Prussia. 
The phrase "Prussian Government" includes in itself 
justice, public order, and the promotion of the public good. 
While from this day forth, by command of His Majesty the 
King of Prussia, I assume the government of the Duchy, and 
promise you at the same time complete attention to your 
peculiar interests, I expect from you obedience to His Ma-
jesty's orders, and confidence. 
Cited by Malet, 116. 
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APPENDIX E 
GIST OF THE PRUSSIAN DESPATCH OF MARCH 24 
Prussia has irrevocably broken with Austria. The Im-
perial Government takes a menacing attitude. Prussia rather 
courts the issue and is re~dy to fight. Prussia expects 
that all Germany will side with her against Austria. The 
Confederation is antiquated and must be remodelled. Prussia 
must have control of the armed force of Germany. 
Malet, 149. 
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APPE1IDIX F 
REVISION OF GABLENZ PROPOSALS 
TI1e paragraphs concerning Schleswig-Holstein remained in gen-
eral unchanged. As future sovereign of the Duchies, Prince 
Albrecht of Prussia was now definitely selected; and to Prus-
sia was given beside the harbor of Kiel, both Duppel and 
Sonderborg. 
The most im9ortant change was made in Article v., about 
the Confederate military organization, which received more 
exact specifications. 'Both Governments,' it read now, 
'shall bring forward in the Confederate Assembly a motion 
for Confederate reform. In this matter the most urgent 
feature is the reform of the Confederate military organization. 
The rights of sovereignty of the Confederate Princes over 
their own contingents shall be preserved; but they shall all 
maintain the same system of organization, of equipment, and of 
drilling. The Emperor of Austria is to be both in peace 
and war, the Confederate commander in the South, the King of 
Prussia in the north. The Confederate commanders have the 
right and duty of providing for this similarity in system 
and organization. Each of them has the right, in urgent cases, 
todispose the army in his charge in readiness for war, with 
the reservation that this disposition shall later be approved 
by a decree of the Confederation. Both governments,' Bismarck 
then added, 'shall without delay urge the acceptance and 
execution of these reforms, and shall not disarm before this 
is accomplished. They shall for this purpose summon a con-
vention of the German Princes and free cities, to be held at 
Weimar. The Princes are invited to bring their Ministers 
with them, and to decide upon some definite result before they 
separate.' 
Cited by Sybel, IV, 
430-432. 
APPE1IDIX G 
PRUSSIAN PLAN OF REFORM 
122 
On June 1, Prussia sent her plan for the future Confederate 
Constitution to all the German Governments. The following were 
the main points: "exclusion of Austria; creation of a Con-
federate marine; division of the supreme military command, 
Prussia taking the North and Bavaria the South; a parliament 
to be elected by the people on the basis of universal suffrage, 
and which should have the functions already specified above 
and sharply defined; and finally, the regulation of the future 
relations with German Austria by means of a special treaty." 
Sybel, IV, 484. 
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APPENDIX H 
~qTICLE XI OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE DIET 
All members of the Confederation engaged to defend Ger-
many, and in like manner each individual Confederate State a-
gainst every attack, and guarantee to each other mutually all 
their possessions comprised in the Confederation. In case of 
war declared by the Confederation no member can enter on in-
dividual negotiations or conclude a truce or peace individual-
ly. The members of the Diet retain the right of contracting 
any alliance, but bind themselves not to make any engagement 
direct against the safety of the Confederation or of any of 
its members. The members of the confederation promise not 
to make war on each other on any pretext whatsoever, or to 
pursue their differences by force, but to lay them before the 
Diet. It then becomes the duty of the Diet to endeavour to 
promote an accord by a committee, and in case such attempt 
should fail, and a judicial decision become necessary, to 
bring this about by a properly instituted Austragal Tribunal, 
to whose sentence the contending parties are bound instantly 
to submit. 
Cited by Malet, 153. 
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